,r,  State  Ubroy 


stj'p)-3- 


APPEAL 


TO    THE 


PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


FOR    A 


W-lxauunation  of  tfe 


OF    THE 


GENERAL  COURT  MARTIAL 


IN  HIS   CASE. 


BY 


MAJ.  GEN'L  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER, 


WITH  ACCOMPANYING  DOCUMENTS. 


MOBBIST.OWN,  N.  J 
1869. 


CONTENTS. 


Appeal  to  the  President. 
I.     General  McClellan's  Opinion. 
IT.     Dr.  Guernsey's  Review. 

III.  General  Longstreet's  Letter. 

IV.  General  Wilcox's  Letter. 
V.     Colonel  Marshall's  Letter. 

VI.     Letter  to  General  Grant. 

VII.     General  Pope's  Protest  to  a  re-examination. 
VIII.     Reply  to  General  Pope's  Protest. 
IX.     Original  appeal  for  re-hearing,  with  Petitions,  etc. 
General  Franklin's  Letter  to  General  Grant 


PRINTED  DOCUMENTS  ACCOMPANYING  APPEAL: 

Record  of  Court  Martial  published  by  Congress,  with  Judge- 
Advocate-General-Holt's  Review. 

Mr.  Reverdy  Johnson's  Reply  to  Mr.  Holt. 

Mr.  Holt's  Reply. 

Volume  9,  Rebellion  Record,  containing  General  R,  E.  Lee's 
Report  of  the  "  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,"  with  Sub-Reports. 


K17896 


MORRISTOWN,  N.  J.,  June  2lst,  1869. 

General  WILLIAM  T.  SHERMAN, 

Commanding  Army  of  the  United  States. 

GENERAL  : — The  President  of  the  United  States  having  as 
sured  my  friends,  who  have  recently  brought  my  case  to  his 
notice,  that  "if  injustice  had  been  done  me  it  should  be  righted," 
and  intimated  a  purpose  of  primarily  obtaining  the  opinion  of 
the  Hon.  Secretary  of  War  an  d  yourself,  as  to  the  mode  of  re 
dress  under  given  circumstances,  I  have  deemed  it  proper  to 
have  put  in  print  the  papers  relating  to  my  case,  with  a  view  of ' 
facilitating  your  examination  of  them. 

The  President,  Secretaty  of  War  and  yourself,  having 
achieved  the  highest  honors  which  successful  generalship  ever 
receives  from  our  people,  I  could  not  covet  an  investigation, 
and,  if  practicable  a  decision  in  my  case,  from  any  superior 
tribunal. 

My  desire  to  have  the  whole  case  as  it  now  stands,  adjudi 
cated  by  soldiers,  will  be  fully  met  by  a  decision  rendered  by 
the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War  and  yourself,  if  such  a 
mode  be,  as  I  trust  it  may  be,  found  practicable. 

I  am,  General, 

With  high  respect, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER. 


APPEAL 


TO    THE 


PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


FOR    A 


§        HP    ' 

w-tsmnhration  of  the 

T      T 


OF    THE 


GENERAL  COURT  MARTIAL 

HIS   CASE. 


BY 


MAJ.  GEN'L  FITZ  JOHN  £ORTER, 


WITH  ACCOMPANYING  DOCUMENTS. 


M  O  R  R  I  S  T  O  W  N  ,  N  .  J . 
1869. 


APPEAL  TO  THE  PRESIDENT. 


MOREISTOWN,  N.  J.,  June  10#A,  1869. 

GENL.  WILLIAM  T.  SHERMAN,  Head    Quarters   of  the  Army, 
Washington,  D.   C. 

Sin : — I  apply  to  you  as  General  Commanding  the  Army,  to 
transmit  to  the  President,  and  to  recommend  to  his  favorable 
consideration,  this,  my  application  to  him  : 

1st.  To  remit  the  sentence  of  the  Court  Martial  now  in  force 
against  me  of  disqualification  "  forever  to  hold  any  office  of 
trust  or  profit  under  the  Government  of  the  United  States  :" 

2nd.  To  be  nominated  to  the  Senate  for  restoration  to  my 
rank  in  the  Army,  under  the  late  act  of  Congress  allowing  that 
mode  of  redress  of  wrong  by  a  Court  Martial. 

I  beg  to  ask,  most  respectfully,  your  intervention  in  my  applica 
tion  to  the  President,  because,  in  the  first  place,  I  desire  to  put 
my  case  before  him  upon  its  merits  unwarped  and  unencum 
bered  by  political  or  party  passion,  and,  in  the  next  place,  be 
cause  I  seek  to  be  judged  as  a  soldier,  by  soldiers  whose  judgment 
the  country  will  respect,  and  history  accept  as  true  and  final. 

With  due  elimination  from  the  investigation  of  all  matters  not 
pertinent  to  the  charges,  I  am  prepared  to  satisfy  such  a  tribunal 
that  my  sentence  was  unjust.  I  have  newly  discovered  evidence 
which  conclusively  establishes  how  false  was  the  principal  ac 
cusation. 

It  is  matter  of  general  information  that  the  allegations 
against  me  were  inspired  by  the  failure  of  General  Pope's  cam. 
paign  in  Virginia.  His  friends  undertook  to  maintain  that  he 
committed  no  error  ;  and  to  attribute  the  result  of  his  operations 
to  the  defection  and  treasonable  misconduct  of  certain  officers 
and  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  who  preferred  to  be 
commanded  by  General  McClellan.  The  formal  charges  were 


6 


OL',  of  tlu-  condition  of  the  enemy  in  my  front  was  cor 
rect,  I  .-mi  satisfied  that  the  documents  herewith  submitted 
\\  ill  convince  the  President,  that  the  sentence  against  me  was  on 
all  points  against  the  clear  weight  of  evidence  in  the  cane. 

As  a  portion  of  the  documents  on  which  I  make  this  ap 
plication,  through  yon,  to  the  President,  I  submit  beside  the 
record  of  the  court,  a  review  thereof  by  Judge-Advocate- 
General  Holt  ;  a  commentary  on  the  latter  by  my  counsel  on 
the  trial,  Mr.  lieverdy  Johnson  ;  letters  from  Generals  Longstreet 
and  Wilcox  and  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  A.  D.  C.,  and  certain 
Confederate  reports  ;  a  review  of  this  last  named  evidence  by 
Doctor  Guernsey ;  and  finally  General  Pope's  protest  against  a 
rehearing  of  my  case,  with  my  reply  thereto. 

I  would  prefer  in  offering  Mr.  Johnson's  Review,  to  modify 
some  passages  in  which  he  has  expressed  warmly  his  generous 
estimation  of  my  services,  and  his  strong  condemnation  of  the 
extreme  and  unparalled  injustice  with  which  I  have  been  treated. 
But,  as  I  deem  it  proper  also  to  lay  before  you,  an  anonymous 
pamphlet  in  reply  thereto,  written  I  am  informed  by  Judge- 
Advocate  Holt,  I  ought  not  to  withhold  anything  in  the  kind 
judgment  of  Mr.  Johnson  concerning  me  and  my  case,  which 
may  be  Mr.  Holt's  provocation  and  defence  for  the  mode  in 
which  I  am  denounced  by  him,  in  his  elaborate  style  of  invective. 
The  language  used  by  Mr.  Holt  will,  I  am  sure,  suggest  to  you, 
and  to  the  President,  that  one  whose  official  partiality  manifests 
itself  by  such  proofs,  ought  not  now  to  deal  officially  with  my 
case. 

For  the  vindication  of  my  conduct  as  a  true  aud  faithful  offi 
cer,  and  of  my  name  and  honor,  before  the  country  I  have  en 
deavored  to  serve,  I  am  chiefly  concerned  to  have  your  judg 
ment  and  the  judgment  of  the  President.  And  in  this  relation 
I  am  glad  to  be  permitted  to  submit  herewith  a  brief  but  com 
prehensive  opinion  on  my  case  by  General  McClellan  and  by 
him  handed  to  me  for  your  perusal. 

I  am  General, 

Very  respectfully 
Your  ob't  sv't., 

FIT/.  JOHN  POUTER. 


[No.  L] 
GEN.  McCLELLAN'S  OPINION". 


In  the  case  of  Genera,!  Fitz  John  Porter,  two  points  seem  to 
li;i\c  been  chiefly  relied  upon  to  justify  the  verdict: 

1st.  The  alleged  failure  to  obey  the  order  of  6.30  P.  M., 
August  27th,  requiring  him  to  move  his  command  at  1  A.  M. 
of  the  28th. 

2nd.  The  alleged  failure  to  attack  on  the  29th  August. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  first  point,  considered  by  itself,  can 
be  disposed  of  very  briefly.  Porter's  troops  were  much  fatigued 
and  needed  rest;  the  night  was  very  dark;  the  road  bad  and 
blocked  by  wagon  trains. 

Porter's  impulse  was  to  obey  the  order  literally,  but  his  sub 
ordinate  Generals  (Morell,  Sykes,  and  Butterfield),  were  so  de 
cided  in  their  conviction  that  the  march  should  be  delayed,  that 
he  yielded  to  their  advice,  and  started  only  at  three  o'clock.  The 
result  showed  that  a  still  greater  delay  would  have  been  judicious, 
as  giving  the  troops  more  rest,  and  bringing  them  to  their  destina 
tion  (mite  as  early  as  they  actually  reached  it — for  they  were  much 
delayed  on  the  march.  It  is  not  charged  that  any  injury  to  the 
service  resulted  from  the  postponement,  and  it  may  confidently 
be  asserted  that  no  unprejudiced  officer  of  experience  would 
maintain  that  Gen.  Porter's  action  in  the  case  warrants  the  severe 
sentence  passed  upon  him.  He  simply  exercised  a  responsibility 
that  must  sometimes  be  taken  by  an  officer  receiving  an  order  from 
a  superior  at  a  distance.  With  sufficient  reasons,  and  from  good 
motives,  he  departed  slightly  from  the  literal  requirements  of 
the  order,  while  he  thoroughly  carried  out  its  spirit ;  his  purpose 
was  to  reach  the  end  of  the  march  in  the  shortest  time,  with  the 
least  fatigue  to  his  men,  and  to  keep  them  in  proper  condition 
for  action.  This  may  have  been  an  error  of  judgment  (I  do  not 
tli ink  it  was),  but  surely  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  crime. 


8 

Now,  as  to  the  second  point,  viz.  :  the  alleged  failure  to  attack 
tin-  cnciny  on  the  29th  of  August. 

I'p  to  about  the  hour  of  noon  on  that  day,  Gen.  McDowell 
was  with  or  near  Gen.  Porter,  and,  as  the  senior  officer,  was 
vested  with  the  command.  He  had  under  his  control  two  divi 
sions  of  liis  own  corps  — those  of  King  and  Kicketts.  About 
noon  lie  separated  himself  from  Porter,  and,  with  his  two  divi 
sions,  marched  off  to  join  Pope,  by  a  road  leading  to  the  left  and 
rear  of  Porter's  position. 

It  is  clear  that  up  to  the  hour  of  noon  the  responsibility  for 
any  failure  to  attack  rested  with  McDowell,  not  with  Porter. 

1  do  not  think  it,  necessary  to  consider  here  the  question 
whether  Gen.  McDowell  ought  to  or  could  have  attacked  with 
the  joint  commands.  I  merely  say  that  up  to  the  period  of  his 
departure  Porter  cannot  be  held  responsible.  Porter's  respon 
sibility  commences,  therefore,  about  noon.  The  strength  of  his 
command,  after  the  departure  of  King's  and  Kickett's  divisions, 
was  about  12,000 — somewhat  less.  Porter  believed  at  the  time, 
from  his  own  observation,  the  statements  of  prisoners,  and  other 
sources,  that  Longstreet  was  in  front  of  him  with  greatly  supe 
rior  force. 

The  positive  evidence  is  now  attainable  to  prove  that  Long- 
street  was  in  position  with  his  whole  command  (more  than 
double  Porter's  corps  in  strength)  before  noon  on  the  29th? 
ready  and  anxious  to  be  attacked,  and,  therefore,  that  Porter's 
opinions  were  correct.  It  appears  clear  that  the  only  opportunity 
of  attacking,  with  o-0od  chances  of  success  and  decisive  results, 
was  early  in  the  forenoon,  and  with  all  the  combined  forces  of 
Gens.  McDowell  and  Porter. 

As  soon  as  the  whole  of  Longstreet's  command  was  in  posi 
tion,  the  result  of  such  an  attack  became  doubtful. 

For  Porter  to  have  made  it,  after  the  withdrawal  of  McDowell's 
two  divisions,  would  have  been  absolute  madness;  for  to  have 
attacked,  with  less  than  12,000  men,  a  force  more  than  double 
in  number,  excellent  in  quality,  and  strongly  posted,  would  have 
ensured  the  complete  repulse  of  the  attacking  party,  with  heavy 

loss. 

That  attacks  must  sometimes  be  made  under  such  circum 
stances  is  no  doubt  true,  for  it  is  sometimes  necessary  for  a 
portion  of  an  army  to  sacrifice  itself  to  save  the  rest  of  the  army, 


9 

or  an  important  part  of  it.  But  it  does  not  appear  that  this  was 
such  a  case.  The  right  of  our  army  was  abundantly  able  to 
take  care  of  itself,  and  was  not  hard  pressed  at  the  time  in 
quest  ion.  The  mere  position  of  Porter's  command  accomplished 
the  very  important  result  of  keeping  at  least  double  his  numbers 
in  front  of  him,  and  paralyzed  them  so  far  as  any  action  against 
our  right  was  concerned.  The  additional  evidence  now  attain 
able  (which  could  not  be  had  at  the  time  of  the  trial)  proves 
beyond  question  that  Gen.  Pope  was  mistaken  in  the  belief, 
which  he  then  entertained,  that  Longstreet  was  still  remote 
from  thelield  of  battle,  and  that  Porter  had  only  a  small  force 
in  his  front ;  it  proves  that  an  attack  made  by  Porter  at  any 
time  after  Gen.  McDowell's  departure  would,  in  all  probability 
— it  might  be  said  with  certainty,  were  there  any  such  thing  as 
absolute  certainty  in  war — have  resulted  in  a  complete  repulse, 
with  great  and  useless  sacrifice  of  life ;  it  proves  that  Porter's 
arrangements  were  excellent,  since  they  enabled  him  to  hold  a 
greatly  superior  force  in  check ;  it  proves  that,  far  from  merit 
ing  the  severe  sentence  imposed  upon  him,  he  in  fact  deserved 
great  praise  for  his  conduct  on  that  day. 

Justice  requires  that  Gen.  Porter's  conduct  on  the  30th,  when, 
as  is  acknowledged,  he  fought  his  corps  most  energetically  and 
desperately,  should  be  kept  in  mind  when  forming  an  opinion  of 
the  transactions  of  the  29th,  especially  in  the  light  of  the  new 
evidence  now  adduced. 

GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN. 

June  4,  1869. 


[No.  II.] 


To  THE  EDITOR  OF  THE  WORLD: 

In  the  course  of  my  studies  on  the  history  of  the  war,  I  have 
had  occasion  to  investigate  minutely  the  facts  in  the  case  ol 
General  Kit/  John  Porter.  The  conclusions  to  which  I  have 
come,  and  the  data  upon  which  they  are  based,  are  set  forth  in 
the  following  paper. 

ALFRED  II.  GUERNSEY. 

NEW  YORK,  July  2nd,  1866. 

On  the  27th  of  November,  1862,  a  court-martial  was  convened 
for  the  trial  of  Major-General  Fit/  John*  Porter,  charged  with 
grave  military  offences.  After  an  investigation  which  lasted 
forty-five  days,  the  accused  was  found  guilty  upon  both  charges 
and  nearly  all  the  specifications  brought  against  him,  and  was 
sentenced  "  to  be  cashiered,  and  to  be  forever  disqualified  from 
holding  any  office  of  trust  or  honor  under  the  government  of  the 
United  Mates" 

I  believe,  and  shall  endeavor  to  show,  that  this  finding  of  the 
court  was  unwarranted  by  the  evidence  as  presented  on  the 
trial,  and  by  the  facts  in  the  case  which  can  now  be  proven.  In 
discussing  this  proposition,  although  much  unpublished  evidence 
has  fallen  into  my  hands,  I  shall  not  resort  to  other  than  official 
documents  of  admitted  validity.  The  authorities  which  I  shall 
(.jfc,  ;,,v — the  "  Proceedings  of  the  Fit/  John  Porter  Court-Mar 
tial,"  which  will  be  cited  as  "  (\)urt- Martial ; "  General  Pope's 
Report  of  his  Campaign,  cited  as  "Po]w*8  7fry>.,"  which  embodies 
many  sub-reports;  and  General  R.  K.  Lee's  Report  of  the 
"Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  cited  as  Reb. 
Rec.,  embodying  many  sub-reports.  The  two  former  documents 
are  published  by  authority  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  ; 
the  last  by  authority  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  and  repub- 
lished  in  Putnam's  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  9. 


11 

The  alleged  acts  of  disobedience  were  committed  on  the  28th 
and  29th  of  August,  1862.  Up  to  that  time,  it  is  conceded  by 
the  prosecution  that  the  military  record  of  Fitz  John  Porter  was 
highly  honorable.  Commissioned  as  Colonel  in  May,  1861,  he 
had  risen  in  ten  months  to  the  command  of  an  army  corps,  as 
Major-General.  His  services  during  the  Peninsular  campaign 
were  certainly  inferior  to  those  of  no  other  commander  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Two  of  the  five  great  battles  which 
marked  the  "  seven  days  "  were  fought  by  him  ;  and  for  his  ser 
vices  at  Malvern  Hill,  General  McClellan  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  that,  if  there  were  another  grade  to  add  to  that  of 
Major-General,  he  would  ask  it  for  Porter.  I  shall  have  occasion 
to  show  that  from  the  30th  of  August  onward  his  military 
conduct  did  not  belie  his  former  reputation. 

On  the  27th  of  August  Jackson  had  turned  the  right  of  Pope, 
fallen  upon  his  rear,  captured  his  principal  depot  of  supplies  at 
Manassas,  and  endangered  his  communications  with  the  capital. 
Porter,  with  his  corps,  had  just  joined  the  army  of  Pope.  He 
had  that  afternoon  arrived  at  Warrenton  Station,  on  the  rail 
road,  ten  miles  from  Bristoe  Station,  where  Hooker  had  just  had 
a  sharp  encounter  with  Ewell's  division  of  Jackson's  corps. 
Pope,  then  at  Bristoe,  sent  an  order  to  Porter,  of  which  the  fol 
lowing  is  the  essential  part : 

The  Major-General  commanding  directs  that  you  start  at  one 
o'clock  to-night,  and  come  forward  with  your  whole  corps,  or 
such  part  of  it  as  is  with  you,  so  as  to  be  here  by  daylight  to 
morrow  morning.  Hooker  has  had  a  very  severe  action  with 
the  enemy,  with  a  loss  of  about  three  hundred  killed  and 
wounded.  The  enemy  has  been  driven  back,  but  is  retiring 
along  the  railroad.  We  must  drive  him  from  Manassas,  and 
clear  the  country  between  that  and  Gainsville,  where  McDowell 
is.  *  *  *  *  It  is  necessary,  on  all  accounts,  that  you  should  be 
here  by  day-light.  ( Court-Martial,  6.) 

This  order,  dated  at  6.30  o'clock  was  received  by  Porter,  at 
about  10  P.  M.  The  distance  to  be  reached  was  about  ten 
miles.  Between  the  two  points  was  the  railway,  with  a  common 
country  road,  running  sometimes  on  one  side,  sometimes  on  the 
other,  and  occasionally  on  both  sides  of  the  track.  The  region 
is  somewhat  broken,  intersected  by  brooks  and  patches  of  wood, 
with  here  and  there  a  swampy  place.  The  road  was  also  con- 


12 

sidi-rably  encumbered    by    wagons.     The    night    was  overcast, 
with  no  moon  visible.      About  midnight  a  rain  set  in,  and  it  be 
came  exln -iii.-ly  dark.      Porter,  after  coiiHultution  with  his  gen 
erals,   Morell,  Sykes,  and    liuttertield,  decided,    for    the    above 
reasons,  to  postpone  the  commencement  of  the  march  until  three 
o'clock,  so  that  the  troops  would  be  fairly  on  their  way  at  day 
light.     These  essensial  facts  are  proved  by  the  testimony  upon 
the  trial.      (Sec-    Court-Martial ;    testimony    of    Sykes,    Morel  1, 
Griffin,  Buttertield,  and  others,  pp.  12:3,  144,  100,  162,  170,  185, 
etc.)     These  officers  and  others  testified  that  Bristoe  would  have 
been  reached  sooner  by  starting  at  three  o'clock  than  at  one 
o'clock ;  that  is,  the  fatigue,  delay,  and  disorder  arising  during 
the  two  hours  of  absolute  darkness  would  have  more  than  coun 
terbalanced    the    time  which   would,    apparently,   have    been 
gained.     As  it  was,  the  head  of  the  column,  owing  to  the  ob 
structions,  did  not  reach  Bristoe  till  after  nine  o'clock.     It  re 
quired  quite  six  hours,  mostly  of  daylight,  to  perform  a  march 
which  the  letter  of  the  order  required  to  be    accomplished  in 
three  hours  of  extreme  darkness.     It  was,  therefore,  physically 
impossible  to  carry  out  the  order  to  its  full  extent.     The  "  dis 
obedience"  consisted  of  postponing  for  two  hours  the  commence 
ment  of  its  execution.     This  deviation  seems   to   me   to  have 
been  one  fairly  within  the  discretion  of  a  corps  commander,  who 
must  have  been  aware  of  many  circumstances  which  the  com 
manding  general,  ten  miles  away,  was  unaware.     The  fact  that 
this  deviation  was  advised  by  officers  of  such  acknowledged  ca 
pacity  and  zeal,  is  presumptive  evidence  that  it  involved  want 
neither  of  zeal  nor  capacity  in  Porter.     In  fact,  as  it  happened, 
it  made  no  difference  whether  Bristoe  was  reached  at  daylight 
or  noon. 

This  charge  would  never  have  been  brought  except  as  a  make 
weight  to  the  far  more  serious  accusations  arising  from  the 
transactions  of  the  next  day.  To  explain  these  I  must  describe 
thc^situation  on  the  20th  of  August,  both  as  it  appeared  to  Pope 
and  Porter,  and  as  it  really  was. 

Jackson,  whose  force  amounted  to  something  more  than  25,000, 
besides  Stuart's  cavalry,  numbering  6,000,  had  taken  up  a  strong 
position  near  the  battle-field  of  Bull  Run.  Here  he  resolved  to 
await  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  who,  as  he  knew,  was  on  the 
march  to  unite  with  him.  Longstreet's  command  numbered 


13 

twenty-one  brigades  (Reb.  Rec.  ix,  574).  The  average  strength 
of  a  confederate  brigade,  at  the  beginning  of  these  operations, 
a  fortnight  before,  was  about  2,500.  Longstreet  had  as  yet  lost 
only  a  few  scores  in  battle ;  but  in  his  rapid  march  some  had 
doubtless  fallen  out  by  the  way,  but  his  brigades  must  still  have 
averaged  2,000,  making  his  effective  strength  more  than  40,000. 
Pope  supposed  him  to  be,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  at  a  dis 
tance  of  from  thirty  to  forty-eight  hours'  march;  for  at  that 
time  he  wrote  to  McDowell  and  Porter :  "  The  indications  are 
that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction 
at  a  pace  that  will  bring  them  here  by  to-morro\v  night  or  the 
next  morning."  (Pope's  Rep.,  241).  This  would  give  him  a 
full  day  and  a  half  to  deal  with  Jackson  alone. 

At  this  time  Pope  had  50,000  men,  so  disposed  that  half  of 
them  could  fall  upon  Jackson  in  front,  while  the  other  half 
should  assail  his  right  Hank  and  rear ;  between  these  two  forces 
he  thought  that  Jackson  must  certainly  be  crushed  before  Long- 
street  could  arrive.  (Pope's  Rep.,  19,  20).  Upon  this  supposi 
tion  were  based  the  orders  of  the  morning  and  afternoon  of  the 
29th,  the  failure  to  carry  out  which  forms  the  ground  of  the 
second  charge  against  Porter.  But,  as  I  shall  show  beyond 
question,  Longstreet  at  that  moment,  so  far  from  being  a  day 
and  a  half  or  two  days'  distant  from  Jackson,  was  on  the  point 
of  uniting,  and  had  actually  in  effect  united  with  him. 

It  is  no  part  of  my  present  purpose  to  criticise  Pope's  cam 
paign,  except  in  so  far  as  relates  to  the  special  matter  in  hand, 
which  is  the  conduct  of  Porter.  But  in  order  to  elucidate  this, 
I  must  endeavor  to  give  a  general  idea  of  the  topography  of  the 
region  in  which  the  operations  of  August  29  and  30  were 
carried  on,  and  of  the  position  of  the  forces  engaged  in  those 
operations. 

The  Bull  Run  Mountains  run  nearly  north  and  south,  and  are 
cloven  by  two  gaps,  Thoroughfare  and  Hopewell,  about  three 
miles  apart.  Jackson  had  marched  up  the  western  side  of  this 
range,  crossed  it  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  swooped  down  up 
on  Pope's  rear.  Longstreet  was  following  upon  the  same  track. 
From  the  mountains,  the  country  slopes  eastward  toward  Bull 
Run  River,  the  distance  between  the  mountains  and  the  river  at 
the  Stone  Bridge  being  ten  or  twelve  miles.  The  intervening 
plain,  known  as  that  of  Manassas,  is  wooded  and  often  rugged, 


14 

Tin-  \V:iiT< -iitiin  turnpike  crosses  this  plain  from  northeast  to 
soul  Invest  ;  the  Mantissas  Gap  Railroad  crosses  it  from  south 
east  to  northwest;  the  railroad  and  turnpike  intersect  each 
other  at  (Gainesville,  a  village  about  midway  between  the  moun 
tains  and  river.  Let  this  figure  (  )  serve  to  represent  these 
Ira tu res,  now  become  historical.  The  line  running  downwards 
from  right,  to  left  stands  for  the  turnpike;  that  running  upwards 
from  right  to  left,  the  railroad.  The  lower  right  hand  corner  is 
Manassas  Junction;  the  upper  right  hand  corner  is  the  Stone 
IJridge,  five  miles  distant.  At  the  intersection  of  the  two  lines 
is  Gainesville  ;  at  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  Thoroughfare  Gap. 
Just  below  the  turnpike,  a  mile  from  the  Stone  Bridge,  is  the 
first  Bull  Run  battle-field;  just  above  it,  two  miles  farther  west, 
is  that  of  the  second  Bull  Run,  more  properly  called  Groveton, 
from  a  hamlet  there  situated.  In  fact,  both  battle-fields  cross 
the  turnpike,  but  the  first  was  mainly  below,  the  second  mainly 
above.  The  distances,  as  closely  as  we  can  measure  them  upon 
the  large  government  map  used  upon  the  trial,  are  :  Thorough 
fare  Gap  to  Gainesville,  five  miles ;  Gainesville  to  Groveton, 
four  miles  ;  Groveton  to  Stone  Bridge,  three  mijes  ;  Manassas  to 
Gainesville  seven  miles. 

Now,  on  the  morning  of  August  29,  Jackson,  with  25,000 
men,  was  drawn  up,  his  right  at  Groveton,  his  line  extending 
northward  about  two  miles.  Directly  in  his  front  was  half  of 
Pope's  force  under  Reynolds,  Sigel,  Heint/leman,  and  Reno, 
twenty-five  thousand  strong.  The  other  half,  of  equal  strength, 
under  McDowell  and  Porter,  lay  along  the  Manassas  Railroad 
from  the  Junction- part  way  to  Gainesville.  According  to  Pope's 
belief,  Longstreet  was  still  west  of  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  al 
though,  as  I  shall  have  to  show,  he  was  by  nine  o'clock  in  the 
morning  east  of  the  mountains  as  far  as  Gainesville,  and  so  with 
in  four  miles  of  the  battle-field  at  Groveton,  where  an  artillery 
contest  at  long  range  had  been  going  on  for  several  hours. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  Pope,  being  then  at  Centre- 
ville,  farther  from  Porter  than  was  Longstreet,  sent  an  order  to 
Porter  and  McDowell,  of  which  the  following  are  the  essential 
portions,  the  omitted  parts  being  explanantory  of  matters  which 
do  not  concern  the  present  inquiry : 

You  will  please  move  forward  writh  your  joint  commands 
toward  Gainsville.  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Reno  are  moving 


15 

On  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  must  now  be  not  far  from 
Guim-snille.  I  desire  that  as  soon  as  communication  is  estab 
lished  between  this  force  and  your  own,  the  whole  command 
shall  halt.  It  may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  behind  Bull  Run  to 
Centreville  to-night.  I  presume  it  will  be  so  on  account  of  our 
supplies.  *  *  *  If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained 
f>>/  departing  from  this  order,  it  will  not  be  strictly  carried  out. 
One  thing  must  be  held  in  view,  that  the  troops  must  occupy  a 
position  from  which  they  can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by 
morning.  The  indications  are  that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  which  will  bring  them  here 
by  to-tnorrow  night  or  the  next  day.  [Court- Martial,  7.] 

General  McDowell  happened  at  that  time  to  be  in  ^he  position 
of  a  corps  commander  without  any  troops  under  him.  Of  his 
two  divisions,  one,  that  of  Ricketts,  had  been  detached  from  the 
main  column  and  sent  to  Thoroughfare  Gap  to  bar  the  passage 
of  Longstreet.  It  was  too  late,  and  had  been  driven  back  on 
the  previous  evening  by  Longstreet,  who  was  already  through 
the  Gap.  McDowell's  other  division,  that  of  King,  but  now 
commanded  by  Hatch,  had  been  temporarily  attached  to  Por 
ter's  corps.  McDowell,  who  had  been  at  Manasses  Junction  all 
the  morning,  came  up  with  Porter  about  noon,  and,  in  virtue  of 
liis  rank  as  senior  general,  took  command  of  the  whole  force. 
Here  some  conversation  ensued  between  the  two  generals. 
McDowell,  as  is  testified  to  by  Colonel  Locke  and  Captain 
Martin  (Court- Martial,  135  and  141),  said  to  Porter,  "  You  are 
too  far  out ;  this  is  no  place  to  fight  a  battle."  McDowell, 
however,  testified  that  he  had  no  recollection  of  having  said  this. 
The  two  generals  then  rode  apart,  when  McDowell  gave  an 
order  to  Porter,  respecting  which  there  is  an  irreconcilable  dif 
ference  of  statement.  McDowell  testifies  (Ibid,  85)  that  Porter, 
pointing  in  the  direction  where  the  joint  order  directed  them  to 
move,  said,  "  We  cannot  go  in  there  anywhere  without  getting 
into  a  fight."  McDowell  at  the  time  understood  the  remark  to 
mean  simply  that  Porter  supposed  the  enemy  was  in  his  imme 
diate  front,  not  that  he  was  indisposed  to  fight.  (Ibid,  89.)  He 
then  directed  Porter  to  "  put  his  force  in  there,"  while  he  him 
self  took  King's  division  of  his  own  corps  in  another  direction. 
Porter  asserts  that  the  order  was  that  he  should  remain  where 
he  was.  (Ibid,  290.) 


16 

While   it,   must    be  admitted  that  McDowell's  positive  testi 
mony    proves  that    he  gave,  or  intended  to  give,  the   order  as 
stated  by  him,  everything  that  followed  shows  that  Porter  must 
have  understood  it  as  stated  by  himself.     But  it  is  not  necessary 
to  dwell  upon  this  point,  for  the  charge   against  Porter  is,  not 
that  he  disobeyed  the  order  of  McDowell,  whatever  it  was,  but 
that  he  disobeyed  the  joint  order  of  Pope.     McDowell,  with  his 
men,  left  that  part  of  the   field,  and  then,  as  he  himself  says 
(Ibid,  92),  Porter  ceased  to   be  under  his  orders,  and    came 
directly  under  those  of  Pope,  their  common  superior,  and  espe 
cially  under  the  joint  order,   which,   being  the    last    received, 
superseded  others  previously  given.     This  order  enjoined  two 
tilings— McDowell  and  Porter  were  to  move  their  joint  com 
mands  towards  Gainsville,  so  as  to  form  a  connection  with  the 
forces  of  Sigel  and  Heintzelman  and  others,  who  were  supposed 
to  be  near  that  place ;  and  they  must  occupy  a  position  from 
which    they  could  reach   Bull   Hun   that    night.     Now,   Sigel, 
Heintzelman,  and  the  others,  instead  of  being  near  Gainesville, 
were  held  in  check  by  Jackson  fully  four  miles  to  the  east,  and 
every    rod   marched   in   the  prescribed    direction   would  have 
removed  McDowell  and  Porter  further  from  a  junction,  besides 
rendering  more  difficult  the  other  condition  of  being  able  to 
reach  Bull  Hun  that  night.     The  order  expressly  provided  that 
either  or  both  generals  to  whom  it  was  jointly  addressed  should 
deviate    from   it  if  important    advantages   would   thereby    be 
trained.     Both  did  so.     McDowell,  instead  of  moving  west  to- 

. 

ward  Gainesville,  moved  north  toward  Groveton.  1  he  propriety 
of  his  so  doing  does  not  appear  to  have  been  brought  in  question. 
Porter,  likewise  using  the  discretion  permitted  by  the  order, 
deviated  from  its  terms  by  remaining  where  he  was.  I  shall 
endeavor  to  show  that  he  also  was  fully  justified  in  so  doing; 
and  that  the  same  holds  good  in  regard  to  a  later  order  from 
Pope,  the  failure  to  comply  with  which  forms  the  real  burden  ol 
the  charges  against  Porter. 

The  order  was  as  follows: 

Your  line  of  inarch  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
1  desire  you  to  push  forward  into  action  at  once  on  the  enemy's 
flank,  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear,  keeping  your  right  in  com 
munication  with  General  Reynolds.  The  enemy  is  massed  in 
the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  can  be  shelled  out  as  soon  as  you 


17 

enagage  their  flank.  Keep  heavy  reserves,  and  use  your  bat 
teries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right  and  rear  all  the  time. 
In  case  you  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  to  your  right  and 
rear,  so  as  to  keep  you  in  close  communication  with  the  right 
wing.  ( Court  Martial,  7.) 

The  joint  order  left  much  to  the  discretion  of  those  to  whom 
it  was  addressed.  The  last  was  peremptory,  and  failure  to  com 
ply  with  it  can  be  justified  only  on  the  ground  of  urgent  mili 
tary  necessity  or  impossibility  of  execution.  This  order  was 
written  at  half-past  four.  The  aid-de-camp  who  bore  it  thinks 
it  was  delivered  about  five,  but  three  unimpeached  witnesses 
(Court  Martial,  127,  130,  136)  show  that  the  time  was  about 
1  in  It-past  six. 

Both  orders  are  based  upon  the  supposition  that  the  "  whole 
force"  of  the  enemy  under  Longstreet  was  full  twenty-four 
hours  distant ;  that  Jackson's  corps  was  the  only  body  to  be  en 
countered  ;  and  that  the  Union  force  consequently  w^as  nearly 
double  that  of  the  confederates.  Whereas,  I  shall  undertake 
to  show  that  Longstreet  had  united  with  Jackson  fully  four 
hours  before  the  last  order  was  written,  and  six  hours  before  it 
was  received,  giving  the  confederates  a  preponderance  of  three 
to  two ;  that  the  line  of  march  prescribed  to  Porter  would  have 
brought  him  almost  directly  upon  the  real  confederate  centre, 
instead  of  upon  its  right  flank  and  rear,  as  Pope  presumed ; 
and  that  the  execution  of  the  order  would  have  involved  the 
annihilation  of  Porter's  corps,  and  could  hardly  have  failed  to 
resujt  in  the  destruction  of  the  entire  Union  army.  I  shall  show 
that  Porter  knew  the  essential  facts  in  the  case,  that  Pope  did 
not,  and  that  consequently  he  was  fully  justified  in  not  comply 
ing  with  the  order. 

The  confederate  reports  embodied  in  Lee's  Report  enable  us 
to  ascertain  the  positions  and  movements  of  his  force  during 
the  29th  of  August. 

On  the  evening  of  the  28th,  Longstreet's  whole  force  bivou 
acked  on  the  east  side  of  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  the  main 
body  passing  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  the  others  through 
Hopewell  Gap,  three  miles  to  the  north,  having  encountered, 
from  Ricketts,  a  slight  opposition  at  the  former  place,  which 
cost  them  only  twenty-five  men,  killed  and  wounded  (Eeb.  Ecc. 
ix,  636).  "  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  the  columns  were 
3 


18 

united,  and   the   march   to  join   Jackson  was  resumed,"  says 
Longstreet  (Ibid,  570).     Hood  (Ibid,  633)  fixes  the  hour  when 
the  march  was  begun.     He  says,  "  The  next  morning  at  day 
light  the  march  was  resumed,  this  division  in  the  advance." 
Daylight  at  this  season  is  about  4.30.     The  head  of  the  column 
could  easily  have  reached  Gainesville,  five  or  six  miles  distant, 
by  eight  o'clock.     That  it  did  so  is  shown  by  General  Buford,  in 
command  of  the  Union  cavalry,  who  at  nine  o'clock  saw  a  large 
force  marching  out  of  Gainesville,  directly  in  the  direction  where 
the  cannonading  was  then  going  on  near  Groveton,  three  or  four 
miles  distant.     He  counted  seventeen  regiments  of  infantry,  one 
battery,  and  about  five  hundred  cavalry.     He   estimated  the 
regiments  at  about  eight  hundred  each,  which  would  give  quite 
fourteen  thousand  men  then  close  upon  the  field.     ( Court-Mar 
tial,  84,  188.)     He  reported  this  at  once  to   McDowell,   who 
received  the  report  and  communicated  it  to  Porter  about  noon. 
(Ibid,  84.)     Pope,  however,  does  not  appear  to  have  received 
this  report  until  evening,  long  after  he  had  given  his  order  to 
Porter  to  attack.     (Ibid,  p.  35.) 

But  these  troops  which  Buford  saw  marching  to  the  field  were 
only  a  part  of  the  confederate  force  pressing  in  the  same  direc 
tion.  Wilcox,  who  commanded  that  portion  which  had  passed 
through  Hopewell  Gap,  says  (Reb.  Eec.  ix.  641)  that  his  force, 
at  9.30,  united  with  the  others  at  a  point  about  two  miles  west 
of  Gainesville.  So  that,  before  ten  o'clock,  the  rear  of  Long- 
street's  corps  was  within  five  miles  of  the  field,  and  the  head— - 
Hood's  division — must  have  actually  made  a  junction  with 
Jackson.  Quite  half  a  score  of  the  confederate  commanders 
speak  of  the  rapidity  with  which  this  ten  miles'  march,  beginning 
at  daylight,  was  performed.  "  Early  in  the  day  "  is  the  phrase 
used  by  several  in  speaking  of  the  time  when  they  came  upon 
the  field  (e.  g.  Hood,  in  Ibid,  633)  ;  and  D.  R.  Jones,  whose 
march  was  furthest  to  his  position  on  the  extreme  right,  says 
(Ibid,  636)  that  he  arrived  on  the  ground  "  about  noon."  Cita 
tions  to  this  eftect  might  be  greatly  multiplied,  all  showing  that 
the  junction  of  Longstreet  with  Jackson  was  fairly  made  by  ten 
o'clock,  and  that  by  noon  the  line  which  was  now  the  confede 
rate  right  and  centre  was  fully  established.  John  Esten  Cooke, 
in  the  "  Life  of  Stonewall  Jackson,"  gives  the  precise  statement 
of  the  facts  in  the  case.  He  says  :  "  All  the  morning  General 


19 

Longstreet  was  coming  into  position."  Lee  and  Longstreet  note 
specifically  the  positions  and  movements  of  eleven  brigades  of 
infantry,  besides  artillery,  all  belonging  to  Longstreet's  corps, 
who  were  posted  in  this  line,  and  moved  in  various  ways  to 
meet  what  they  supposed  to  be  the  exigencies  of  the  moment, 
ami  all  considerably  before  the  hour  when  Pope  ordered  the 
grand  assault  of  the  afternoon  upon  Jackson's  left.  Pope 
(Report.  21),  says  he  gave  the  order  at  5.30  ;  but  Grover,  who 
bore  the  most  brilliant  part  in  the  attack,  says  (Ibid,  77)  that 
he  received  the  order  at  three.  The  confederate  reports  place 
this  attack  still  earlier.  Thus  Jackson  (Reb.  Rec.,  ix.  578)  says  : 
"  About  two  o'clock,  P.  M.,  the  federal  infantry  in  large  force 
advanced  to  the  attack  on  our  left,  occupied  by  the  division 
under  General  Hill;"  and  Ferno  (Ibid,  652)  says  that  his  bri 
gade  "  occupied  the  right  of  our  line  until  after  the  arrival  of 
Longstreet,  when  we  rejoined  our  division  in  the  centre  ;  and  at 
3.30  were  ordered  to  advance,  .and  soon  after  engaged  the 
enemy."  Jackson  says  (Ibid,  578):  "During  the  day,  the 
commanding  general  arrived,  and  also  General  Longstreet  with 
his  command."  Lee  says  (Ibid,  277):  "After  the  arrival  of 
Longstreet,  the  enemy  changed  his  position,  and  began  to  con 
centrate  opposite  Jackson's  left,  opening  a  brisk  artillery  fire." 

These  citations  show  that  Longstreet's  corps  came  upon  the 
ground  between  the  hours  of  10  A.  M.  and  2  P.  M.  That  they 
took  no  serious  part  in  the  action  in  the  afternoon  was  owing  to 
the  fact  that  Stuart,  whose  cavalry  was  charged  with  the  pro 
tection  of  Longstreet's  right,  reported  the  presence  of  the 
federal  troops  in  strong  force  in  that  quarter,  threatening,  as  he 
supposed,  Longstreet's  extreme  right.  Lee  therefore  sent  the 
bulk  of  Longstreet's  command  there,  instead  of  sending  them 
to  the  direct  support  of  Jackson.  This  force,  which  prevented 
Lee  from  re-inforcing  Jackson  in  the  afternoon,  was  that  of 
Porter. 

But  toward  sun-down  McDowell  was  ordered  forward  along 
the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  had  a  sharp  fight  Avith  the  enemy. 
Hatch,  who  commanded  the  division,  tells  the  story  of  this  at 
tack  :  "  We  were  met  by  a  force  consisting  of  three  brigades  of 
infantry.  These  were  supported  by  a  large  portion  of  the  rebel 
forces,  estimated  by  a  prisoner  who  was  taken  at  their  rear  at 
about  30,000  men,  drawn  up  in  successive  lines  extending  a  mile 


20 

and  a  half  to  the  rear."  (Pope's  Rep.  177).  The  result  was 
tint  Hatch  \\:is  driven  back.  These  three  brigades,  as  will  be 
seen  by  ex:mmiing  the  confederate  reports  of  Lee,  Longstreet, 
:ind  Ili.od  (AW,.  Rec.  TX,  277,  570,  631),  were  the  two  of  Hood 
and  the  one  of  Evans;  as  well  as  the  supporting  brigades,  all 
belonged  to  Longstreet's  corps.  But  they  were  only  a  part  of 
it,  for  Longstreet's  line  stretched  southward  beyond  the  Ma- 
nasses  Railroad,  out-flanking  Porter. 

Thus  the  entire  "  main  body"  of  the  confederate  army  was 
certainly  within  three  hours'  march  at  the  very  moment  when 
Pope  in  his  joint  order  placed  them  at  a  distance  of  thirty-six 
to  forty-eight  hours  ;  they  were  on  the  field  when  he  wrote  the 
peremptory  order  to  Porter  to  advance  to  the  attack  ;  they  were 
preparing  to  attack  Pope  at  the  very  hour  when  this  order  was 
received'  by  Porter.  (Ibid  633).  Fully  40,000  strong,  they 
occupied  mainly  the  very  position  which  Pope  supposed  to  be 
empty,  to  which  Porter,  with  10,000  or  12,000  at  most,  was  di 
rected  to  march  in  order  to  fall  upon  Jackson's  right  and  rear. 
Porter's  prescribed  line  of  march  would  have  brought  him  upon 
the  very  centre  of  this  force,  strongly  posted  and  greatly  out 
numbering  him.  The  presence  of  this  force,  known  to  Porter, 
and  wholly  unsuspected  by  Pope,  so  changed  all  the  conditions 
upon  which  the  order  was  based,  as  to  render  its  execution 
wholly  impracticable ;  and  therefore  he  would  not  have  been 
justified  in  executing  this  order  even  had  it  reached  him  in  time 
to  have  made  a  decided  movement  practicable,  for  he  must  have 
known  that  the  order  was  given  in  utter  ignorance  of  the  actual 
position  of  affairs.  Forty  thousand  and  more  men,  of  whose 
presence  his  Commanding-General  knew  nothing,  stood  in  the 
way  of  his  executing  an  order,  to  carry  out  which  he  had  but  a 
quarter  as  many. 

The  facts  which  I  have  adduced,  each  one  of  which  is  proven 
bv  evidence  which  seems  to  be  of  unquestioned  authority, 
seem  to  me  to  show  : 

1.  That  in  respect  to  the  order  of  the  28th,  Porter  obeyed  it 
in  substance;  and  that  in  the  apparent  deviation  from  its  terms, 
by  commencing  his  march  at  three  o'clock  instead  of  one  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  he  did  not  exceed  the  limits  of  the  discretion 
vested  in  the  commander  of  a  corps  ;  and  that  his  course  was 


21 

advised  and  approved  by  officers,  than  whom  none  in  our  army, 
then  and  since,  stood  higher  in  respect  to  zeal  and  courage. 

2.  That,  in  respect  to  the  joint  order  of  the  29th,  ample  dis 
ci  vt  ion  was,  by  the  very  terms  of  the  order,  given  both  to  Por 
ter  and   to  McDowell,  to  decide  whether  it  should  be  carried 
out ;  and  that  in  the  action  under  this  authority  both  were  fully 
justifiable. 

3.  That  in  failing  to  comply  with  the  order  of  4.30  o'clock, 
Porter  was  justifiable  on  the  ground  that  it  would  not  have 
been  given  had  his  commanding  officer  been  aware  of  the  real 
circumstances  of  the^  case  ;  and  that  the  attempt  to  execute  it, 
had  there  been  time,  would  have   involved  not  merely  failure, 
but  the  annihilation  of  his  corps,  and  probably  the  destruction 
of  the  army  of  which  it  formed  a  part. 

4.  That,  therefore,  the  court-martial   should  have  honorably 
acquitted  Porter  upon  both  charges,  and  all  the  specifications 
under  which  he  was  arraigned. 

Here,  as  far  as  the  court-martial  and  its  finding  are  concerned, 
the  case  properly  ends.  But  the  charges,  as  preferred,  contained 
another  specification,  assuming  that  Porter,  on  the  30th  of 
August : 

Having  received  a  lawful  order  from  his  superior  officer, 
Major-General  John  Pope,  to  engage  the  enemy's  lines  and  to 
carry  a  position  near  their  centre,  and  to  take  an  annoying  bat 
tery  there  posted,  did  proceed  in  the  execution  of  that  order 
with  unnecessary  slowness,  and  by  delay  gave  the  enemy  oppor 
tunities  to  watch  and  know  his  movements  and  to  prepare  to 
meet  his  attack,  and  did  finally  so  feebly  fall  upon  the  enemy's 
lines  as  to  make  little  impression  upon  the  same,  and  did  fall 
back  and  draw  away  his  forces  unnecessarily,  and  without  mak 
ing  any  of  the  great  personal  efforts  to  rally  his  troops  or  to 
keep  their  lines,  or  to  inspire  his  troops  to  meet  the  sacrifices 
and  to  make  the  resistance  demanded  by  the  importance  of  his 
position,  and  the  momentous  consequences  and  disasters  of  a 
retreat  at  so  critical  a  juncture  of  the  day.  {Court-Martial,  9.) 

This  charge  was  indeed  withdrawn,  the  Judge-Advocate  de 
clining  to  attempt  to  prove  it.  [Though  this  specification  was 
withdrawn  by  Judge- Advocate  Holt,  no  evidence  of  the  fact 
appears  in  the  order  promulgating  the  finding  of  the  court.  No 
such  order  was  given  me,  nor  any  order  other  than  that  quoted 


22 

by  Dr.  Guernsey,  "  to  pursue  the  enemy  in  his  retreat,  and  press 
him  vigorously  <lnriii<j  the  whole  day"  That  enemy  was  known 
at  the  time  to  be  strongly  posted  in  our  front,  and  anxiously 
wishing  an  attack  by  us. — F.  J.  P.]  And  so  the  accused  was  -hut 
out  from  any  attempt  to  rebut  it.  But  it  stands  upon  record  as 
having  been  preferred,  and  General  Pope  brings  it  in  substance 
in  his  report  (p.  24),  and  in  his  testimony  before  the  court.  I 
deem  it  right,  therefore,  to  touch  upon  the  transactions  of  Aug 
ust  30,  the  last  day  of  the  series  of  battles  known  in  history  as 
"  the  second  Bull  Run,"  or  "  the  second  Manassas,"  or,  more 
properly,  "the  Battles  of  Groveton."  I  shall  speak  of  them 
only  in  so  far  as  they  bear  upon  the  part  taken  by  Porter  in  that 
disastrous  battle. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Porter,  in  obedience  to  an  order 
from  Pope,  came  upon  the  battle-field.  At  daylight,  Pope  had 
received  intelligence  which  made  him  "  feel  discouraged  and 
nearly  hopeless  of  any  successful  issue  to  the  operations  with 
which  he  was  charged."  (Report,  23.)  But  soon  after,  he 
wrote  to  the  General-in-Chief  that  he  had  won -a  victory  over  the 
"  combined  force  "  of  the  enemy.  He  had  just  been  told  that 
the  enemy  were  in  full  retreat,  and  he  was  going  to  the  front  to 
see.  He  was  convinced  that  this  was  true.  "  McDowell  and 
Heintzelman,  who  had  reconnoitered  the  positions  held  by  the 
enemy's  left  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,  reported  that  these  posi 
tions  had  been  evacuated,  and  that  there  was  every  indication 
that  he  was  retreating  in  the  direction  of  Gainesville."  (Pope's 
Rep.  22.) 

Never  was  there  a  more  grave  mistake.  Lee,  who  had  come 
up  on  the  previous  day,  and  assumed  the  control  of  all  the  op 
erations  on  the  field,  had  merely  withdrawn  Jackson's  ex 
treme  left  a  little ;  and  during  the  morning  had  swung  Long- 
street's  corps  around  directly  from,  instead  of  towards  Gaines 
ville.  (Reb.  Rec.  ix,  636).  The  confederate  right,  which  on  the 
day  before  had  run  pretty  nearly  in  a  line  with  its  left,  HOAV 
formed  almost  a  right  angle  with  it.  Its  shape  was  that  of  an 
open  Y  reversed  thus  ^.  Pope's  entire  effective  force  on  that 
morning,  as  given  by  himself,  (Report  23),  was  40,000  men. 
Lee's,  making  allowances  for  losses  in  action  and  on  the  march, 
was  fully  60,000  exclusive  of  cavalry. 

Pope,  although,  as  he  himself  says,  aware  that  "  by  twelve  or 


23 

one  o'clock  in  the  day  we  were  confronted  by  forces  greatly  su 
perior  to  our  own,  and  these  forces  were  being  every  moment 
largely  increased  by  fresh  arrivals  of  the  enemy  from  the  di 
rection  of  Thoroughfare  Gap"  (Pope's  Rep.  24),  resolved  to  at 
tack,  or,  as  his  order  of  twelve  o'clock  states,  to  "  pursue  the  en. 
emy,"  whom  he  knew  to  be  advancing  instead  of  retreating. 

"  The  following  forces,"  says  the  order  from  Pope  (which  is 
to  be  found  in  McDowell's  report),  "  will  be  immediately  thrown 
forward  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  press  him  vigorously  du 
ring  the  whole  day.  Major-General  McDowell  is. assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  pursuit.  Major-General  Porter's  corps  will 
push  forward  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  followed  by  the  di 
visions  of  Brigadier-Generals  King  and  Reynolds." 

Of  Porter's  attack  Pope  says  : 

"  It  was  neither  vigorous  nor  persistent  and  his  troops  soon 
retired  in  considerable  confusion.  *  *  Porter's  forces 
were  rallied  and  brought  to  a  halt  as  they  were  retiring  to  the 
rear.  As  soon  as  they  could  be  used  I  pushed  them  forward  to 
support  our  left, "and  they  there  rendered  most  distinguished 
service,  especially  the  brigade  of  regulars  under  Colonel  Bu 
chanan."  (Pope's  Rep.,  24). 

A  few  brief  extracts  from  the  reports  of  commanders  of  Por 
ter's  corps,  who  took  part  in  this  action,  will  show  the  true 
character  of  this  "feeble  attack." 

General  Sykes,  after  describing  the  strong  and  sheltered  po 
sitions  of  the  enemy,  says  : 

"  About  4  P.  M.  I  was  ordered  to  support  an  attack  to  be 
made  by  General  Butter-field.  This  attack  was  based  upon 
the  supposition  that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat— so  announced 
in  the  orders  of  General  Pope.  Porter's  army  corps  was  to  be 
the  centre  of  operations.  *  Butterfield's  at 

tack  was  gallantly  made  and  gallantly  maintained  until  his 
troops  were  torn  to  pieces.  My  first  brigade,  under  Colonel 
R.  C.  Buchanan,  moved  to  his  aid,  relieved  him,  and  became 
furiously  engaged.  The  enemy,  posted  in  a  railroad  excava 
tion,  was  as  secure  as  earthen  embankments  could  make  him, 
and  as  our  troops  emerged  from  the  woods  they  were  met  by 
withering  volleys  that  decimated  their  ranks.  Their  own  fire 
was  almost  harmless  against  a  sheltered  foe.  The  enemy,  seeing 
the  failure,  and  that  one  weak  point  lay  on  my  left,  in  front  of 


24 

Warren,  poured  on  his  weak  command,  under  cover  of  the  for 
est,  a  mass   of  infantry  that  enveloped,  almost  destroyed  him. 
It  became  necessary  to  retire  from  the  ground  we  occupied, 
chanan's  and  Chapman's  brigades  did  go  in  columns  of  regiments, 
in  line  of  battle  under  a  severe  artillery  fire,  and  never  wavered. 

*  *     The  enemy  continuing  to  outflank  our  left,  Buchanan  was 
ordered  to  the  support  of  our  forces  engaged  in  that  direction, 
maintained  a  gallant  and  bloody  conflict  with  the  foe  until,  out 
numbered  and  badly  crippled,  I  directed  him  to  retire.     Chap 
man,  thrown  in  previous  to  Buchanan,  fighting  desperately  for 
three-quarters  of  an  hour,  was  also  ordered  to  retire. 

*  *       After  my  command  reunited,  I  received  orders  to  move 
on  to  Centreville,  and  reached  there  at  midnight,  intact   and  in 
excellent  order."     (Sykes,  in  Pop Js  Rep.,  156-148). 

I  do  not  find  any  report  by  Butterfield  of  his  attack ;  but  the 
foregoing,  from  Sykes,  proves  the  gallantry  with  which  it  was 
made.  Warren  also  speaks  in  similar  terms.  He  says : 

As  soon  as  General  Butterfield's  brigade  advanced  up  the  hill 
there  was  a  great  commotion  among  the  rebel  forces,  and  the 
whole  side  of  the  hill  and  edges  of  the  woods  swarmed  with  men 
before  unseen.  *  *  *  After  making  a  most  desperate  and  hope 
less  fight,  General  Butterfield's  troops  fell  back  and  the  enemy 
immediately  formed  and  advanced.  (  Warren,  in  Pope's  Rep, 
150.) 

Of  the  gallantry  of  Warren's  brigade,  it  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  of  his  two  regiments,  numbering  but  1,000  men,  431  were 
killed  or  wounded.  All  the  foregoing  belonged  to  Porter's 
corps.  King's  division  was  also  under  Porter's  command,  and 
was  no  less  prominent  in  the  attack.  Hatch,  who  now  com 
manded  this  division,  says : 

Porter  directed  me  to  post  the  division  on  the  right  of  his 
own  troops,  and  to  make  the  attack  simultaneously  with  himself 
At  the  word  given  by  General  Porter,  the  division  advanced, 
with  an  interval  of  fifty  yards  between  the  lines.  The  enemy 
were  very  strongly  posted  behind  an  old  dis-used  railroad  em 
bankment,  where,  according  to  their  own  statement,  they  had 
been  awaiting  us  for  two  days.  *  *  *  The  contest  for  the 
possession  of  this  embankment  was  most  desperate.  The  troops 
on  both  sides  fought  with  the  most  determined  courage,  and  I 


25 

doubt  not  the  conflict  at  this  point  Was  one  of  the  most  bloody 
of  the  whole  war. 

The  confederate  official  reports  are  equally  direct  and  explicit 
as  to  the  vigor  with  which  this  attack  by  Porter  was  made. 
Thus,  General  Lee  says : 

About  3  P.  M.  the  enemy,  having  massed  his  troops  in  front  of 
General  Jackson,  advanced  against  his  position  in  strong  force. 
His  front  line  pressed  forward  until  engaged  at  close  quarters  by 
Jackson's  troops,  when  its  progress  was  checked,  and  a  fierce 
struggle  ensued.  A  second  and  third  line  of  great  strength 
moved  up  to  support  the  first,  but  in  doing  so  came  within  easy 
range  of  a  position  a  little  in  advance  of  Longstreet's  left.  (Reb. 
Rec.  ix.  277.) 

The  "  lines  "  thus  mentioned  were  Porter's,  for  those  were  the 
only  troops  opposed  to  Jackson's  right  and  Longstreet's  left. 
Longstreet  says : 

Just  after  reaching  my  first  line,  I  received  a  message  for  re 
inforcements  for  General  Jackson,  who  was  said  to  be  severely 
pressed.  From  an  eminence  near  by,  one  portion  of  the  enemy's 
masses  attacking  General  Jackson  were  immediately  within  my 
view,  and  in  easy  range  of  batteries  in  that  position.  It  gave 
me  an  advantage  that  I  had  not  expected  to  have,  and  I  made 
haste  to  use  it.  (Ibid,  571.) 

The  statement  that  the  troops  which  were  pressing  Jackson 
were  within  view  from  Longstreets  left,  and  within  range  of  his 
batteries,  shows  that  they  were  Porter's,  for  his  were  the  only 
ones  in  such  a  position.  Hood  (Ibid,  633),  says:  "The  battle 
was  commenced  by  a  most  vigorous  attack  by  the  enemy  upon 
the  right  of  General  Jackson."  ^Jackson  says  of  this  part  of  the 
engagement : 

About  4  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  federal  infantry  advanced 
in  several  lines,  first  engaging  the  right,  but  soon  extending  its 
attack  to  the  centre  and  left.  As  one  line  was  repulsed  another 
took  its  place,  and  pressed  forward  as  if  determined,  by  force  of 
numbers  and  fury  of  assault,  to  drive  us  from  our  positions.  So 
impetuous  and  well-sustained  were  these  onsets  as  to  induce  me 
to  send  to  the  commanding  general  for  re-enforcements ;  but  the 
timely  and  gallant  advance  of  General  Longstreet  on  the  right, 
relieved  my  troops  from  the  pressure.  As  Longstreet  pressed 
4 


26 

upon  (In-  riii'lit,  the  federal  advance  was  checked,  and  soon  a 
general  advance  of  my  whole  line  was  ordered. 

The  vigor  and  persistency  of  an  attack  may,  in  a  measure  at 
least,  be  estimated  from  the  loss  suffered  and  inflicted.  Porter's 
own  corps  numbered  that  morning,  according  to  Pope,  7,000 
men.  It  lost  in  this  action  2,171  men,  of  whom  333  are  put 
down  as  killed,  1,323  wounded,  518  missing;  but  as  the  field 
remained  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  many  of  those  returned 
merely  as  "  missing  "  were  undoubtedly  killed.  The  losses  in 
King's  division,  which  also  attacked  under  Porter,  were  heavy ; 
but  I  find  no  report  of  the  numbers. 

So  much  for  the  attack  by  Porter,  which  Pope,  in  contradic 
tion  to  all  who  bore  part  in  it  on  either  side,  declares  to  have 
been  "  neither  vigorous  nor  persistent ;  "  and  which  the  aban 
doned  charge  before  the  court-martial  characterizes  still  more 
severely.  No  wonder  that  the  Judge-Advocate,  whom  no  one 
will  accuse  of  doing  his  duty  negligently  in  this  trial,  abandoned 
this  charge.  I  think  I  have  shown  that  on  the  30th  of  August, 
at  Groveton,  Fitz  John  Porter's  conduct  was  worthy  of  the 
general  who,  on  the  27th  of  June,  fought  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor,  and  on  the  1st  of  July  won,  according  to  McClellan, 
the  chief  honors  at  Malvern  Hill. 

There  was  much  matter  introduced  upon  the  trial,  which 
should  not  have  influenced  the  finding  of  the  court.  It  was 
apparent  from  the  evidence  that  there  was  an  unpleasant  state 
of  feeling  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  that  of  Vir 
ginia.  Pope,  in  his  general  order  upon  assuming  the  command, 
had  sneered  at  the  manner  in  which  the  war  had  been  conducted 
at  the  East.  The  Eastern  officers  had  little  confidence  in  Pope's 
military  capacity.  Porter  certainly  shared  in  this  distrust ;  but 
there  is  no  evidence  that  this  feeling  was  expressed  in  an  im 
proper  manner,  or  that  it  in  the  least  interfered  with  his  military 
conduct  while  under  Pope's  command. 

Again,  it  is  evident  that  Porter  was  warmly  attached,  both 
personally  and  professionally,  to  General  McClellan.  But  no 
one  will  say  that  this  feeling  was  other  than  praiseworthy.  The 
student  of  history,  who  investigates  some  subsequent  campaigns, 
will  find  abundant  reason  to  regret  that  other  corps  commanders 
had  not  shared  in  this  feeling  for  the  generals  commanding. 

The  Judge- Advocate,  indeed,  in  his  u  Review  "  addressed  to 


27 

the  President,  dwelt  at  length  upon  what  he  supposed  to  be  the 
"  animus "  of  the  accused.  But,  if  my  conclusions  are  well 
founded  that  there  is  no  criminality,  this  must  all  be  dismissed. 
Still,  if  any  one  wishes  to  investigate  the  question  of  criminal 
"  animus,"  I  am  confident  that  he  will  be  convinced,  even  from 
t  he  evidence  adduced,  that  the  accusation  rests  upon  no  tangible 
proofs,  and  was  unworthy  of  being  mentioned  by  the  Judge- 
Advocate. 

It  has  been  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  inquire  how  and  why  a 
court-martial  came  to  a  conclusion  which,  in  my  judgment,  is  so 
wholly  contrary  to  fact  and  justice.  But  I  think  I  have  proved 
that  a  great  wrong  has  been  done.  And  for  every  legal  wrong- 
there  is  a  legal  remedy.  It  is  due  to  the  nation,  as  well  as  to 
Fit/  John  Porter,  that  the  wrong  be  righted  as  far  as  it  can  now 
be  done. 


[No.  III.] 


COFFINVILLE,  Miss.,  September  23d,  1866. 
F.  J.  PORTER,  ESQ.,  New   York  City. 

$IR  : — Your  letter  of  the  7th  inst.  reached  me  at  this  point  a 
few  days  ago.  I  have  no  objections  to  the  questions  contained 
in  your  letter,  if  my  answers  are  not  to  be  made  use  of  in  the 
public  prints,  and  should  have  no  objection  to  that  but  for  the 
peculiar  position  which  I  now  occupy.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to 
do  so  I  shall  answer  your  questions,  relying  upon  your  discretion 
in  the  use  you  may  make  of  the  matter. 

Ans.  1st.  My  command  arrived  within  supporting  distance  of 
Jackson's  command  about  9  A.  M.,  29  August,  near  Groveton. 

2d.  Do  not  remember  the  time  at  which  I  heard  that  my  right 
was  threatened.  But  remember  to  have  moved  a  column  to  my 
right  to  meet  such  threatening  force,  or  rather  to  have  moved  a 
column  to  re-inforce  my  right. 

3d.  My  command  was  deployed  in  double  line,  for  attack,  be 
tween  10  A.  M.  and  12  P.  M.,  on  the  29th,  extending  from  Jack 
son's  right  across  Turnpike  and  Manasses  Gap  R.  R.  Do  not 
remember  definitely  the  strength,  but  all  of  my  command  proper 
was  up.  R.  H.  Anderson  arrived  that  night  with  three  or  four 
brigades,  and  was  then  assigned  to  my  command. 

4th.  My  command  was  ready  to  receive  any  attack  after  1 1 
o'clock  A.  M,  ;  and  we  all  were  particularly  anxious  to  bring  on 
the  battle  after  12  M.  ;  General  Lee  more  so  than  the  rest. 

5th.  My  recollection  of  the  ground  on  my  right  is  that  artillery 
could  not  be  handled  on  it,  and  that  infantry  could  not  have 
been  handled  so  as  to  make  a  formidable  attack. 

6th.  If  you  had  attacked  any  time  after  12  M.,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  surely  would  have  destroyed  your  army.  That  is,  if 
you  had  attacked  with  less  than  twenty-five  thousand  men. 

When  I  return  to  New  Orleans  I  may  be  able  to  furnish  more 
satisfactory  information  than  I  can  at  this  distance  from  my 


papers 


etc. 


I  ;im  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 


[No.  IV.] 


NEW  YORK,    October  11,  1866. 
GEX.   F.  J.  PORTER,  New    York. 

GENERAL  : — Your  letter  of  yesterday  has  been  received  and 
read,  and  your  quessions  propounded  in  it  will  be  answered  fully 
and  cheerfully,  and  with  all  the  truth  possible  at  this  time — 
more  than  four  years  after  the  date  of  the  incidents  referred  to. 

In  reply  to  your  first  question,  I  will  state  my  command  left 
Hopewell  Gap  early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  August, 
1862,  and  continued  its  march  rapidly  till  the  other  portion  of 
Longstreet's  command  was  encountered  marching  on  the  road 
from  Thoroughfare  Gap  to  Gainesville.  My  troops  halted  till 
the  others  had  passed,  and  then  followed  closely  in  the  rear. 
The  halt  was  for  a  short  time,  as  the  troops  had  been  passing 
for  some  time.  The  time  of  junction  of  my  command  with  the 
other  portions  of  Longstreet's  command,  I  gave^in  my  report  of 
second  Manasses,  at  9:30  A.  M.  It  is  also  stated  that  after  ad 
vancing  some  three  miles  beyond  Gainesville,  my  brigades  were 
formed  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left  of  the  Pike,  and  at  right 
angles  to  it,  and  advanced  near  a  mile  and  halted,  the  enemy 
being  in  our  front.  Several  of  our  batteries  were  in  position 
on  the  left  of  the  Pike  firing  at  the  enemy,  and  his  batteries 
replying,  most  of  the  balls  and  shells  falling  short  of  my  com 
mand,  which  was  about  1000  yards  in  rear  of  the  artillery. 

Second  question.  I  think  it  was  near  2  P.  M.  when  my  com 
mand  halted  in  rear  of  our  batteries,  and  this  halt  was  made,  I 
should  say,  one  and  one-half  miles  short  of  Groveton,  or  a  little 
over  this  distance.  Other  portions  of  Longstreet's  command 
were  in  my  front  on  both  sides  of  the  Pike.  I  was  in  rear  to 
support. 

Third  question.  In  my  report  I  stated  that  at  4:30  or  5  P.  M., 
my  brigades  were  moved  across  to  the  right  of  the  Pike  a  mile 


30 

or  inmv  t<>  tin-  Manages  Gap  railroad.  Here  they  were  fonm •«! 
some  inoo  yanl>  in  rear  of  other  troops  (D.  R.  Jones),  and  to 
meet  a  supposed  movement  of  the  enemy  on  this  part  of  the 
field. 

Fourth  question.  I  did  not  move  up  to  our  front  lines,  and  so 
had  no  knowledge  from  a  close  inspection  of  the  ground  in 
front,  but  I  have  been  from  the"  Pike  near  Groveton  on  horse 
back,  both  to  Manasses  Junction  and  Bristoe  Station,  in  the 
autumn  of  1861,  and  remember  the  general  features  of  the 
country,  and  should  say  it  would  have  been  very  difficult,  and 
attended  with  much  delay,  to  have  taken  infantry  and  artillery 
over  that  country. 

Fifth  question.  As  stated  in  answer  to  second  question,  T  was 
in  rear  as  a  support,  and  can't  be  precise  as  to  either  the  time 
of  formation  on  the  south  side  of  the  Pike,  or  as  to  the  brigades 
that  were  formed  on  that  side.  The  troops,  I  think,  were  two 
brigades  under  D.  K.  Jones,  Evans  and  three  other  of  Long- 
street's  brigades,  including,  also,  Hood's  Texas  brigade. 

Sixth  question.  I  should  think  that  by  11  A.  M.,  had  you  at 
tacked  the  troops  on  the  Pike,  and  to  the  right  (our  right)  of 
the  Pike,  you  would  probably  have  been  repulsed  ;  10,000  troops 
would  have  been  rather  a  light  body  for  an  attack  at  that 
point,  for  our  side  would  have  been  increased  certainly  and  rap 
idly  until  the  rear  (my  command)  had  come  up. 

With  reference  to  the  last  paragraph  of  your  letter,  in  which 
reference  is  made  to  evidence  given  by  three  officers  on  your 
trial,  to  the  effect  that  none  of  Longstreet's  forces  were  in  your 
front,  or  in  support  of  Jackson's  right  before  sundown,  I  will 
state  that  I  was  the  last  to  form  on  the  right  of  the  Pike,  and 
that  I  formed  at  the  time  I  stated  above,  and  when  I  formed  on 
the  right  of  the  Pike  there  was  but  one  brigade  on  Longstreet's 
left — Jones'  brigade,  Hood's  division. 

1  have  read  Dr.  Guernsey's  article  in  the  World,  and  on  such 
points  as  I  have  knowledge  of,  regard  it  as  quite  accurate  and 
just.  The  strength  of  our  brigades  are  over  estimated,  I  think. 
In  my  three,  twro  had  about  sixteen  hundred  muskets,  and  the 
other  about  twenty-two  hundred  or  twenty-three  hundred.  The 
distance  from  Hopewell  Gap  to  Gainesville  was,  I  think,  more 
than  five  miles.  Thoroughfare  Gap,  I  should  say,  was  also  more 


31 

than  that  distance.     It  is,  however,  only  my  opinion,  formed  by 
marching  over  the  ground  but  once. 

The  attack  made  on  Jackson's  right  on  the  30th  was  made  with 
great  vigor  by  the  leading  column.  So  much  as  I  saw  was 
crc'ditable  in  the  extreme  to  the  attacking  column.  The  sup 
ports  to  the  part  of  your  attacking  column  that  I  saw  were 
broken  by  a  close  and  well  directed  artillery  fire. 

Very  truly,  &c., 

C.  M.  WILCOX. 


[No.  V.] 


BALTIMORE,  Mai/  30?A,  I860. 
GEN.  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER,  New   York. 

GENERAL:— I  received  your   message,  through   Gen.  Field 
about  1  P.  M.  to-day,  and  am  sorry  that  you  need  the  informa 
tion  so  soon,  as  I  have  to  leave  home  at  4  P.  M.  to  be  absent  a 
few  days,  and  will  not,  therefore,  be  able  to  state  the  force  < 
the  confederate  army  at  the  second  Manassas  as  accura 
might  do  with  a  little  more  time.  ? 

The  infantry  of  Jackson  was  in  three  divisions— Jackso 
Division  Ewell's,  under  Lawton  (after  28th),  and  A.  P.  E 

Longstreet  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  August  with 
D    R  Jones'  division  of  three  brigades,  Hood  with  two   bri- 
-ades,  Evans  one,  Wilcox  three,  Kemper  three.     Jackson  was 
reduced  by  hard  marching  and  fighting  before  the  \ 
according  to  the  best  recollection  I  have  now,  his  effective  info 
try  on  the  29th  was  about  twenty  thousand.     Longstreet  had,  as 
you  will  see,  twelve  brigades  of  infantry  on  the  29th. 
his  effective  present  was  probably  not  less  than  thirty  thousa 
as  some  of  the  brigades  were  pretty  full. 

There  were  about  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  and,  I  think,  abc 
the  ordinary  complement  of  artillery  to  such  an  infantry  force  a 
we  had  ;  perhaps  a  little  less  than  we  generally  used. 

I  think  it  safe  to  say  our  total  effective  present  was  : 
Longstreet,    infantry,..  <   JMJJ 

Jackson,  ' 

Artillery  for  both, 4>°^ 

Cavalry, '/     *f? 

The  cavalry  had  been  greatly  reduced  by  hard  servic 

we  got  to  Manassas. 

The  corps  organization  had  not  then  been  completed. 

D.  H.  Hill  was  en  route  from  Richmond,  as  also  was  McLaws. 


33 

R.  H.  Anderson  came  up  early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th, 
in  time  to  have  re-inforced  Longstreet,  and  was  held  in  reserve. 
He  had  about  7,000. 

The  arrival  of  D.  H.  Hill's  and  McLaw's  divisions  after  the 
battle  of  the  30th,  both  of  which  were  large,  and  had  seen  no 
service  since  the  battles  around  Richmond,  about  restored  our 
effective  strength. 

I  can  speak  with  some  definiteness  as  to  the  time  of  Long- 
street's  arrival  on  the  29th,  though  I  cannot  fix  the  exact  hour. 
But  I  do  know  that  his  troops  came  into  the  turnpike  road  from 
the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  striking  the  turnpike  near 
Gainesville.  As  they  came  up  to  the  position  occupied  by 
Jackson,  some  of  them  were  at  first  advanced  to  take  position 
on  his  right,  which  rested  near  the  turnpike,  and  which  the 
federal  troops  appeared  to  be  endeavoring  to  turn.  The  appear 
ance  of  Longstreet' s  column  caused  an  immediate  change  in 
Gen.  Pope's  dispositions,  and  his  left  was  drawn  back,  so  as  to 
bring  his  line  nearly  or  quite  at  right  angles  to  the  road.  Long- 
street's  troops  were  then  pushed  forward  as  they  reached  the 
ground,  and  formed  on  Jackson's  right,  extending  our  line  at 
right  angles  to  and  east  of  the  turnpike.  Most  of  Longstreet's 
troops  had  reached  or  were  reaching  their  position,  when  Stuart, 
who  was  on  our  right,  reported  the  approach  of  a  force  from  the 
direction  of  Manassas,  or  rather  by  the  road  leading  by  our 
flank  to  Manassas,  and  by  the  other  towards  Bristoe.  As  soon 
as  this  report  had  been  received,  General  Lee  sent  D.  R.  Jones' 
division,  not  yet  in  line,  to  the  right,  recalled  part  of  Longstreet's 
troops,  already  formed  or  forming  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and 
moved  them  around  to  support  Jones.  The  result  was  that  the 
greater  part  of  Longstreet's  command  changed  front  from  north 
to  east,  and  remained  fronting  the  troops  approaching  from 
Manassas  until  some  time  in  the  afternoon  (some  of  them  until 
night).  Those  troops,  I  understood  afterwards,  were  yours,  and 
I  am  positive  that  they  approached  the  field  after  Longstreet's 
arrival,  and  that  the  disposition  of  his  troops  had  to  be  changed 
to  meet  them,  as  I  have  above  described.  I  cannot  give  the 
hour,  because  I  did  not  come  from  Thoroughfare  Gap  with  the 
column.  I  slept  the  night  before  at  a  house  west  of  the  Gap, 
had  a  chill  in  the  night,  and  was  not  ready  to  go  with  General 
Lee,  who  left  about  sunrise,  but  followed  him  as  soon  as  the 
5 


34 

fever  following  the  chill  subsided.  I  passed  the  Gap  certainly 
as  early  as  8  A.  M.,  and  took  the  road  through  Haymarket  to 
Gainesville.  The  road  was  clear  of  troops,  nor  did  I  come  up 
with  any  until  I  reached  the  turnpike,  where  I  found  some  halted 
on  each  side  of  the  road,  those  at  the  head  of  the  column  at  that 
time  moving  to  occupy  the  first  position  as  above  described. 
If  I  can  be  of  any  assistance  to  you  in  ascertaining  the  truth, 
I  shall  be  pleased  to  do  so.  I  was  an  eye  witness  of  the  circum 
stances  that  were  afterwards  made  the  ground  of  charges 
against  you,  and  do  but  repeat  the  sentiment  of  every  officer  in 
our  army  who  was  present,  when  I  say  that  those  circumstances 
were  not  truly  presented  before  the  Court. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

CHARLES  MARSHALL. 


[ISTo.  VI.] 


YORK,  September  16,  1867. 
GENERAL  IT.  S.  GRANT,  Secretary  of  War. 

GENERAL  :  —  I  am  to-day  in  receipt  of  a  copy  of  a  report  sent 
to  me  by  order  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  endorsed 
upon  my  application  for  a  Board  to  re-examine  the  proceedings 
in  my  case. 

From  the  Report  to  the  President  I  understand  that  you  de 
sire  "  I  should  demonstrate  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  authorities 
my  ability  to  controvert  by  new  evidence  the  testimony  on 
which  I  was  convicted." 

I  presume  an  outline  of  the  testimony  I  propose  to  adduce 
before  the  Board  to  be  appointed,  is  all  that  you  either  desire 
at  my  hands  at  this  time,  or  your  time  will  permit  you  to  inves 
tigate. 

In  this  view  of  the  case  I  respectfully  beg  leave  to  submit, 
that: 

Under  the  charge  of  violating  the  Ninth  Article  of  War,  in 
not  marching  at  one  o'clock  instead  of  three  o'clock  on  the  night 
of  the  27th  of  August,  1862,  upon  which  I  was  adjudged  guilty, 
I  propose  to  show  by  General  Patrick,  Colonel  H.  C.  Ransom  _ 
a  member  of  Pope's  Staff  at  the  time  —  and  others,  that  it  was 
impossible  to  have  made  an  effective  march  that  night  at  an 
earlier  hour,  and  that  when  I  moved  no  delay  attributable  to 
me  was  had. 

Under  the  charge  of  failing  on  the  29th  of  August,  1862, 

"  To  push  forward  my  forces  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear, 
etc.,  as  well  as  that  I  did  retreat  from  advancing  forces  of  the 
enemy,  without  any  attempt  to  engage  them,  or  to  aid  the 
troops  already  fighting  greatly  superior  numbers,  etc.,"  and 
that  the  other  portion  of  the  army  "  were  relying  on  the  flank 
attack  I  was  then  ordered  to  make  to  secure  a  decisive  victory, 


and   to  capture  the  enemy's  army,  a  result  which  must  have 
followed  from  said  flank  attack  had  it  been  made,  etc." 

In  as  much  as  the  possibility  of  such  action  by  me  as  he  de 
sired  at  any  period  within  hours  of  the  time  which  General 
Pope  considered  available,  depends  altogether  upon  the  time  in 
the  afternoon  at  which  the  order  was  received  by  me,  or  the 
time  when  action  under  that  order,  or  the  discretion  allowed  me, 
would  have  been  of  service,  I  propose  to  show  by  the  testimony 
of  Generals  Longstreet,  Wilcox  and  others,  whose  letters  I  place 
in  your  hands  for  perusal,  that  at  no  time  for  hours  anterior  to 
the  writing  of  General  Pope's  order,  was  there  a  possibility  of 
my  making  the  movement  directed  by  him,  except  with  the  cer 
tainty  of  annihilation  of  my  command  ;  inasmuch  as  by  the 
testimony  of  these  and  other  confederate  officers,  it  is  shown 
that  the  corps  of  Longstreet,  numbering  not  less  than  30,000 
men  (my  own  command  being  less  than  11,000  men)  was  in  my 
front  hours  before  the  order  of  General  Pope  to  me  was  even 
penned ;  and, 

That  the  position,  which  was  the  only  tenable  one  left  to  me 
under  the  circumstances,  did  accomplish  all  and  more  than  the 
strict  fulfillment  of  General  Pope's  order  contemplated,  in  that 
I  held  (as  shown  by  Generals  Longstreet  and  Wilcox's  letters 
before  referred  to)  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  in  my  front  that 
else  would  have  engaged  other  portions  of  our  army,  already 
fully  employed  as  has  been  shown. 

The  reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — since  pub 
lished  in  the  "  Rebellion  Record,"  volume  9 — all  corroborate 
the  position  taken  by  me  (upon  information  had  at  that  time), 
as  not  only  correct,  but,  as  General  Longstreet  now  says,  "  Had 
you  attacked  me  at  any  time  after  12  M.,  we  surely  would  have 
destroyed  your  army,  if  you  had  attacked  with  less  than  25,000 
men." 

Making  little  or  no  reference  to  my  official  conduct  during  the 
years  preceding  the  period  immediately  under  consideration,  I 
also  propose  to  show  that  my  subsequent  conduct,  and  that  of 
the  troops  under  my  command — that  is,  on  the  30th  of  August,  the 
day  following  the  one  wherein  it  is  alleged  General  Pope's  orders 
were  disobeyed — was  of  siu-h  a  character  as  to  prove,  in  the 
most  conclusive  manner,  my  energy  and  fidelity. 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  do  this,  as  the  court  did  not  deem 


'37 

the  testimony  at  the  time  admissible — the  specification  having 
been  withdrawn  under  which  I  had  hoped  to  do  so. 

I  shall  have  the  testimony  of  Generals  ButterfieldJ  Sykes,  and 
others  in  my  behalf. 

I  may  have  occasion  to  revert  to  some  of  the  testimony  taken 
before  the  previous  court  in  the  course  of  the  re-investigation, 
and  with  the  light  thrown  upon  many  matters  by  the  close  of 
the  war,  thus  give  an  opportunity  for  those  who  desire  to  revise 
their  testimony. 

Evidence  more  or  less  important  011  other  points  is  at  hand, 
but  too  tedious  to  present  for  your  consideration  at  this  time.  I 
propose  to  bring  it  forward  from  time  to  time  before  the  Board, 
as  circumstances  may  require. 

I  am,  General,  wTith  high  respect, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER. 


[VII.] 


HEAD  QUARTERS  THIRD  MILITARY  DISTRICT,  [ 
ATLANTA,  GEORGIA,  Sept.  IGt/t,  1867.       f 

GENERAL  IT.  S.  GRANT,  Washington   City: 

GENERAL, — As  I  am  one  of  the  principal  parties  concerned  in 
the  case  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  and  as  I  learn  that  he  is  in  Wash 
ington  City  seeking  a  re-opening  of  his  case,  on  the  ground  that 
he  has  come  into  possession  of  testimony  since  the  close  of  the 
war  which  has  an  important  hearing  on  the  subject,  and  as  I 
suppose  it  is  not  unlikely  that  a  commission  may  be  ordered  to 
examine  that  testimony  and  report  upon  it,  I  consider  it  my 
duty,  as  well  as  my  right,  respectfully  to  submit  to  your  atten 
tion,  or  that  of  any  commission  that  may  be  ordered,  the  fol 
lowing  remarks  for  such  consideration  as  they  merit. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  set  out  here  in  detail  the  charges  and 
specifications  on  which  Fitz  John  Porter  was  tried  and  con 
victed,  but  I  respectfully  ask  to  submit  a  few  remarks  upon 
them,  merely  to  call  attention  to  the  points  of  the  case  estab 
lished  by  testimony  and  uncontroverted  by  the  defence.  The 
only  answer  made  by  the  defence  to  the  facts  established  is  in 
the  way  of  explanation  or  excuse. 

To  the  first  charge  and  first  specification  (the  disobedience  of 
orders  being  admitted  by  defence),  the  answer  is,  the  night  was 
dark,  and  there  was  danger  of  delay  and  straggling  in  execut 
ing  the  order  for  the  march  ;  but  it  will  be  noticed,  and  I  ask 
especial  attention  to  this  fact,  that  no  attempt  was  even  made 
to  obey  the  order.  It  was  also  established  in  the  testimony  on 
the  subject  that  the  whole  of  McDowell's  and  Sigel's  corps 
marched  nearly  all  night  that  same  night  on  a  march,  but  five 
or  six  miles  north  of  Porter's  corps,  and  that  during  the  whole 
night  messengers  were  passing  between  my  head  quarters,  to 
which  Porter  was  ordered,  and  his  own  and  other  corps  of  the 
army. 


39 

•  How  valid  such  an  excuse  as  darkness  is  in  the  face  of  a  pos 
itive  order  setting  forth  that  the  presence  of  his  corps  "was 
necessary  on  all  accounts,"  I  leave  to  your  judgment;  es 
pecially  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  not  even  an  attempt  was 
made  under  such  pressing  orders  and  necessities  to  bring  the 
corps  forward.  The  whole  of  the  circumstances  on  this  point 
are  fully  set  forth  in  the  testimony. 

Although  the  general  plea  of  "  not  guilty"  was  made  by  the 
defence  to  all  charges  and  specifications,  yet  it  was  not  disputed 
that  the  orders  set  forth  in  specifications  to  the  charges  were 
received.  Neither  (except  in  the  case  of  the  joint  order  to 
McDowell  and  Porter)  is  it  claimed  that  the  orders  were  obeyed. 
Substantially  the  details  set  forth  in  all  the  specifications  ex 
cept  the  fourth  and  fifth  specifications  of  the  first  charge,  and 
the  fourth  specification  of  the  second  charge  remain  undisputed, 
except  as  to  certain  phrases  and  words  and  the  general  impres 
sion  conveyed.  The  only  defence  set  up  was  in  the  way  of  ex 
cuse,  and  comprises  two  points : 

1st.  That  the  ground  in  front  of  Porter's  corps  was  difficult, 
and  that  the  road  on  which  he  wras  marching  was  occupied 
by  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy,  who  extended  across  it. 

2d.  That  the  enemy  was  believed  to  be  in  heavy  force,  and 
that  an  attack  would  have  been  unsuccessful. 

To  the  first  of  these  points  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  that 
the  difficulty  of  ground,  even  if  it  existed,  is  no  excuse  for  fail 
ing  to  obey  an  order,  and  particularly  for  failing  to  try  to  obey 
it. 

The  fact  established  in  the  testimony  that  the  enemy  next 
day  moved  over  this  very  ground  and  attacked  our  left,  is  suffi 
cient  answer  as  to  difficulty  of  ground,  should  such  a  pretext 
be  thought  to  have  any  weight. 

In  relation  to  the  force  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  Porter,  I  beg 
leave  respectfully  to  submit  that  that  question  has  no  bearing 
on  the  subject.  Whether  there  were  five  thousand  or  fifty 
thousand  of  the  enemy  confronting  Porter  is  a  matter  not  at  all 
affecting  the  question  of  his  conduct.  A  general  battle  was 
and  had  for  hours  been  raging  on  Porter's  right,  and  almost  in 
his  sight,  certainly  in  his  hearing.  He  had  in  his  command 
nearly  a  third  of  the  whole  Union  army.  His  corps  had  been 
re-inforced  by  Piatt's  Brigade,  and  numbered  (juite  12,000  men. 


40 

One  of  his  divisions  contained  nearly  the  whole  of  the  regular 
army. 

It  was  abundantly  supplied  with  artillery,  and  was  altogether 
the  most  effective  corps  on  the  field.  It  had  marched  only  three 
or  four  miles,  and  was  therefore  by  far  the  freshest  corps  in  the 
entire  army.  Yet  it  did  not  fire  a  gun  during  the  entire  battle 
of  the  29th  of  August,  1862,  but  lay  on  the  ground  with  its 
arms  stacked  for  seven  hours  of  that  battle  without  an  attempt 
either  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front,  or  to  come  to  the  assistance  of 
the  other  troops  elsewhere  engaged  in  deadly  conflict,  and  who 
(as  Porter  himself  says  in  his  dispatch  addressed  to  McDowell 
and  King)  he  believed  were  being  overpowered  and  driven  from 
the  field. 

In  the  face  of  a  positive  order  to  attack  he  did  not  move,  and 
when  convinced  from  the  sounds  of  the  battle  on  his  right,  that 
that  portion  of  the  army  was  worsted,  he  retired  from  the  field, 
not  towards  the  army  which  needed  his  help,  but  in  the  opposite 
direction,  although  the  road  was  open  to  him,  and  messengers 
and  orderlies  were  passing  to  and  fro.  These  are  facts  estab 
lished  by  the  testimony,  and  undisputed  by  the  defence.  If,  in 
a  general  battle,  a  corps  or  a  division  commander,  receiving  a 
positive  order  to  attack  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  has  the 
right  to  disobey  this  order  on  the  ground  that  he  does  not  be 
lieve  the  attack  would  be  successful,  I  cannot  see  how  any  com 
binations  can  be  made  by  the  commanding-General,  or  how  he 
can  expect  that  any  of  his  orders  will  be  obeyed.  How  can  a 
corps  commander  know  that  the  General-in-chief  expects  his  at 
tack  to  be  successful  ?  How  can  he  know  that  he  is  not  ordered 
to  attack  a  particular  point  of  the  enemy's  line,  in  order  that 
sufficient  force  to  resist  his  attack  may  be  withdrawn  from 
other  points  to  render  an  assault  elsewhere  successful  ?  How 
can  he  know  that  his  attack  is  not  intended  to  prevent  the 
enemy's  troops  in  front  of  him  from  re-inforcing  other  parts  of 
their  line  upon  which  an  attack  is  being  made  ?  The  effect  of 
an  attack  by  Porter,  even  had  he  been  repulsed,  at  any  time 
from  mid-day  to  eight  o'clock,  on  the  evening  of  the  29th  of 
August,  1862,  is  clearly  set  forth  in  General  McDowell's  testimo 
ny  in  this  case.  Had  Sherman  failed  to  attack  the  enemy's  right 
at  Chattanooga,  on  the  ground  that  the  enemy  was  in  strong 
force,  and  he  would  be  repulsed  (as  indeed,  was  the  fact)  what 


41 

would  have  become  of  Hooker — what,  indeed,  of  the  entire  vic 
tory  at  Chattanooga  ?  In  truth,  I  feel  ashamed  to  offer  any  ar 
gument  to  military  men  on  such  a  matter.  They  are  potent, 
and  as  well  recognized  as  the  first  principles  of  discipline. 

I  say,  then,  that  whether  the  enemy's  force  in  front  of  Porter 
was  great  or  small,  it  makes  not  the  slightest  excuse  for  his 
not  obeying  his  orders,  nor  can  any  excuse  be  found,  even  ad 
mitting  the  above  to  be  one,  for  an  officer  who  not  only  diso 
beys  an  order  to  attack  but  absolutely  keeps  a  larger  effective 
force  out  of  action  anywhere  during  a  whole  day  of  battle  in 
his  presence.  If  he  was  afraid  to  attack  in  his  front,  why  did 
he  not  bring  his  corps  to  the  aid  of  the  rest  of  the  army  which 
he  says  himself  (in  his  despatch  to  McDowell  and  King)  he  be 
lieves  was  being  worsted  ?  Why  above  all  did  he  march  away 
from  instead  of  towards  the  Union  Army  ? 

The  amount  of  the  enemy's  force  in  front  of  him,  I  need  not 
farther  say,  has  no  bearing  upon  the  subject,  since  he  knew  not 
for  what  purpose  an  attack  was  ordered;  but  it  so  happens  in 
this  case  that  testimony  on  that  point,  unimportant  and  irrele 
vant  as  it  is,  is  at  hand.  I  presume  it  will  be  admitted  that 
the  best  authority  as  to  the  amount  of  the  enemy's  force  in 
iront  of  Porter  on  the  29th  August,  1862,  is  the  report  of  the 
officer  in  command  of  the  enemy  confronting  him  on  that  day. 
This  officer  was  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  of  the  rebel  army. 
He  is  now  dead,  but  fortunately  his  report  is  to  be  found  in  the 
volume  of  rebel  reports  of  the  campaign,  published  by  the 
rebel  congress.  Copies  of  these  published  reports  are  in  the 
hands  of  the  Government,  and  easily  accessible. 

He  (General  Stuart)  reports  that  he  commanded  on  Jackson's 
right  on  the  29th  August,  1862,  with  a  ridiculously  small  force 
of  cavalry  and  some  small  guns  ;  that  he  saw  a  heavy  force, 
which  he  estimated  at  20,000  men,  marching  upon  Jackson's 
flank ;  that  he  was  made  very  uneasy,  and  sent  back  word  to 
Jackson  ;  that  he  disposed  of  his  small  cavalry  force  so  as  to 
make  as  great  a  display  as  possible,  and  made  thirty  or  forty 
of  his  men  cut  brush  and  gallop  up  and  down  the  Warrenton 
turnpike  in  his  rear,  so  as  to  make  a  great  dust,  and  give  the 
impression  that  heavy  forces  were  on  that  road  ;  that  his  ruse 
was  successful,  and  that  the  enemy  halted  and  then  fell  back. 
He  further  states  that  this  force  was  Fitz  John  Porter's  corps. 


42 

I  do  not  pretend  to  quote  literally,  but  this  report  can  easily  be 
had,  and  the  exact  words  ascertained.  Further  than  this, 
Longstreet  himself  reports  of  his  own  corps,  the  strength  of 
which  can  be  easily  ascertained,  that  he  had  made  forced  marches 
for  several  days  before,  and  a  very  long  and  hard  forced  march 
on  that  day,  fighting  part  of  the  time  with  Rickett's  division. 

It  is  certain  his  corps  was  in  little  condition,  when  it  arrived 
on  the  field,  to  contend  with  Porter's,  which,  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
of  equal  strength,  was  perfectly  fresh,  and  contained  the  best 
troops  of  the  army.  To  say  at  this  day,  that  Longstreet's  wea 
ried  and  almost  broken-down  corps  was  able  to  overpower  the 
fifth  corps  of  our  army,  is  the  bitterest  commentary  upon  that 
corps  its  worst  enemy  could  make,  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  is 
utterly  groundless.  It  would  indeed  be  remarkable,  if  over 
powering  forces  of  the  enemy  were  all  day  in  front  of  Porter, 
that  he  was  not  attacked  by  them — as  astonishing  as  his  own 
failure  to  attack. 

I  cite  these  facts  as  to  the  force  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  Por 
ter  merely  as  they  seem  to  be  interesting,  and  not  because  they 
have  any  bearing  whatever  upon  Porter's  guilt  or  innocence. 
That  was  determined  upon  other  grounds,  which  no  military 
man  will  fail  to  recognize. 

I  beg  attention,  however,  to  what  will,  I  think,  very  fully 
explain  Porter's  conduct. 

Despatches  sent  from  him  to  Burnside,  sent  before  and  after 
he  joined  me,  and  intended,  as  he  says  himself,  for  McClellan, 
are  to  be  found  on  the  records  of  the  court-martial.     They  indi 
cate  a  state  of  mind,  and  a  hostility  and  bitterness,  I  will  ven 
ture   to    say,   unparalleled   under   such   circumstances.      They 
present  the  grossest  and  most  outrageous  violation  of  discipline 
and  military  propriety,  to  say  nothing  of  ordinary  good  man 
ners,  which  can  be  found  on  any  official  record  in  this  country. 
That  a  subordinate  officer,  in  face  of  the  enemy,   without 
knowledge  of  the  number  or  disposition  either  of  the  enemy's 
forces  or  our  own,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  deadly  conflict,  upon 
which  the  very  existence  of  the  government  and  the  lives  of 
thousands  of  patriotic  men  were  at  stake,  could  write  such  dis 
patches  almost  surpasses  belief.     As  I  said,  it  indicates  a  state 
of  mind  capable  of  anything,  and  these  dispatches  themselves 


43 

furnish  the  completes!  explanation  of  Porter's  conduct  which 
can  ever  be  given. 

I  take  it  for  granted,  as  the  general  facts  set  forth  in  the 
specification  of  the  charges  against  Porter  were  and  are  com 
pletely  proved|  that  the  testimony  he  now  brings  forward  upon 
which  to  base  a  re-opening  of  his  case,  is  simply  testimony  as 
to  the  amount  of  the  enemy's  force  in  front  of  him  on  the  29th 
August,  1862. 

I  respectfully  submit  that  such  testimony,  even  if  strictly  true, 
has  no  bearing  upon  the  findings  and  sentence  of  the  court- 
martial  in  his  case,  and  furnishes  no  reason  whatever  for  re 
opening  the  case. 

I  am,  General, 

very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JNO.  POPE, 
JBvt-Maj-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 


[No.  VIII.] 


NEW  YORK,   October  IGth,  1867. 

To  His  Excellency,  ANDBEW  JOHNSON, 

President  of  the   United  States. 

SIR  :_ I  have  been  permitted  to  read  a  communication  from 
Major-General  John  Pope  to  General  Grant,  Secretary  of  War, 
in  which  the  former  asserts  himself  to  be  "  one  of  the  principal 
parties  concerned  "  in  my  case,  and  considers  it  his  duty,  as  well 
as  his  right,  to  enter  his  protest  against  the  appeal  for  a  re-ex 
amination  of  the  proceedings  which  Senators  Wilson,  Sherman, 
Harris  and  Foster,  Governor  Curtin,  General  Banks,  Hon.  Hor 
ace  Greeley  and  other  distinguished  citizens,  have  in  my  behalf 
asked  at  your  hands. 

In  my  application  to  you  for  a  re-examination  of  the  charges 
against  me,  I  supposed  I  had  avoided  every  expression  which 
could  offer  embarassment  to  any  gentleman  connected  with  the 
prosecution  who  felt  disposed  to  revise  testimony  given  by 
him  on  the  trial,  by  the  light  of  newly  discovered  evidence.  In 
what  I  have  done  to  vindicate  my  good  name  everything  has 
been  open  and  in  the  light  of  day.  I  have  not  endeavored  to 
create  public  opinion  or  control  it.  I  have  not  asked  for  con 
gressional  or  any  other  final  action  in  advance  of  facts  ascer 
tained  under  the  forms  and  sanction  of  military  judicature.  I 
have  not  asked  for  the  appointment  of  an  inferior  commission, 
but  have  urged  the  selection  of  a  Board  of  Officers  so  high  in 
rank  and  in  public  esteem,  that  its  decision  would  everywhere 
carry  conviction  of  the  soundness  thereof.  You  are  aware  that 
so  careful  have  I  been  to  exclude  all  possibility  of  partisan 
prejudice  or  political  emotion,  that  I  suggested  that  my  appli 
cation  be  referred  to  General  Grant  for  report  and  action  there 
under.  Against  this  disposition  of  my  case  Major  General  Pope 
alone  protests.  He  has  no  willingness  to  avail  himself  of  *  he 


45 

opportunity  offered  to  assist  in  the  proposed  inquiry  for  the  as 
certainment  of  truth,  but  rises  up  as  an  accuser  in  a  case  in 
which,  at  one  time,  he  only  claimed  to  be  an  unwilling  wit 
ness. 

Distinguished  Senators  and  upright  citizens,  familiar  with  the 
whole  field  of  military  operations  during  the  late  war,  represent 
to  the  President  that  evidence  unattainable  at  the  former  trial, 
pertinent  to  the  issues  involved,  and  now  within  easy  access,  is 
sufficient  to  warrant  the  appointment  of  a  commission  "  to  ex 
amine  this  evidence  and  ascertain  whether  injustice  has  not  been 
done  ?"  but  Major-General  Pope  protests  against  being  again 
required  to  submit  his  statements  and  allegations  to  such  a  test. 
Will  your  Excellency  permit  me  to  so  far  trespass  upon  your 
time  as  to  place  on  record  a  few  suggestions  in  answer  to  the 
volunteered  oommunication  of  Major-General  Pope,  which,  while 
they  serve  to  show  the  errors  amid  which  that  officer  still  wan 
ders,  may  perchance  indicate  to  you  the  importance  of  the 
newly  discovered  evidence  now  accessible  ? 

The  main  points  contained  in  General  Pope's  communication 
may  be  summed  up  as  follows  : 

1st.  That  no  attempt  was  made  to  execute  the  order  of  6.30 
P.  M.,  of  August  27th,  1862,  to  march  at  one  o'clock  at  night, 

&G. 

Answer.  I  shall  show  by  recorded  testimony,  to  which  I  pro 
pose  to  materially  add,  that  I  attempted  and  did  execute  the 
order  as  far  as  practicable,  the  only  modification  being  a  change 
in  the  hour  of  march  from  one  to  three  o'clock.  This  change 
was  induced  by  the  remonstrance  of  officers  next  to  me  in 
command,  whose  judgment,  skill,  and  bravery  can  never  justly 
be  called  in  question.  They  urged  that  literal  compliance  was 
impossible,  and  would,  if  attempted,  render  my  corps  wholly- 
unlit  for  the  additional  service  specified  for  that  morning  ;  my 
troops  then  being  without  food,  wearied  by  long,  forced,  and 
unceasing  marches.  It  was  also  urged  and  agreed  that  even  at 
three  o'clock,  when  the  troops  did  move,  no  substantial  progress 
could  be  made  till  increasing  light  permitted. 

2nd.  That  it  is  established  in  testimony  that  both  McDowell 
and  Sigel's  corps  marched  nearly  all  that  night  (August  27th), 
a  few  miles  north  of  my  corps. 

,  In  the  spirit  in  which  this  allegation  is  presented  by 


46 

General  Pope,  he  is  in  error,  for  I  shall  establish  by  new  testi 
mony  that — 

The  turnpike  over  which  these  corps  were  directed  to  march 
that  night  was  of  a  much  better  character  than  the  country  road 
my  command  was  to  traverse,  and  that — 

During  the  short  time  these  corps  were  marching,  the  same 
difficulties  were  experienced  as  by  my  troops,  and  that  no  sub 
stantial  gain  or  progress  was  made  in  the  darkness ;  and  also 
that— 

Officers,  some  of  them  members  of  General  Pope's  staff,  leav 
ing  my  camp  at  midnight  for  Bristoe  Station  (my  destination), 
were  forced  from  the  road  by  obstructions,  and  lost  their  way 
in  the  darkness,  though  conducted  by  an  experienced  guide,  and 
did  not  reach  General  Pope  till  8  A.  M.,  on  the  28th. 

3d.  "  That  it  is  not  disputed  General  Pope's  orders  were  re 
ceived." 

Answer.  It  is  disputed  that  General  Pope's  orders  were,  in 
any  case,  received  within  a  reasonable  period  after  they  pur 
ported  to  have  been  issued.  It  can  be  shown  that  all  of  General 
Pope's  orders  were  delayed  in  the  delivery ;  and  it  is  proved 
by  the  testimony  of  General  Sykes,  Colonel  Locke,  Captains 
Montieth,  Weld  and  others,  that  the  order  of  4.30  P.  M.  on 
29th  August,  was  not  received  by  me  till  too  late  to  execute. 

4th.  That  the  enemy  did,  on  the  30th  August,  "  pass  over  the 
ground  claimed  by  me  as  impassable,  and  attack  the  left  of  our 
army." 

Anstcer.  The  facts  are  that, "although  the  enemy  did,  on  the 
day  succeeding  that  in  question,  i.  e.,  on  the  30th  of  August, 
succeed  in  pushing  some  troops  over  a  portion  of  the  ground 
regarded  impassable,  in  the  immediate  presence  of  an  opposing 
force,  still  they  were  employed  from  early  in  the  morning  to  2 
o'clock  P.  M.,  in  doing  that  which  even  General  Pope's  own 
version  allowed  me  less  than  three  hours  to  accomplish ;  and 
there  is  the  additional  fact  that  no  force  of  ours  then  opposed 
the  enemy,  whereas  on  the  preceding  day  I  was  expected  to 
traverse  the  same  ground  in  much  less  time,  overwhelmingly 
opposed : 

That  no  artillery  was  taken  by  the  enemy  through  or  over 
that  ground,  and 

That?  as  I  shall  prove  by  General  Longstreet  and  others,  the 


47 

ground,  by  reason  of  its  broken  character,  dense  woods,  &c., 
was  not  only  impracticable  for  the  handling  of  artillery,  but 
also  for  the  successful  handling  of  infantry  in  any  large  body. 

In  a  word,  the  testimony  of  Generals  Reynolds  and  Morell, 
Colonel  E.  G.  Marshall  and  others,  as  adduced  heretofore,  is 
completely  established. 

5th.  "  That  a  general  battle  was  and  had  been  raging  on  my 
right,  and  almost  in  my  sight — certainly  in  my  hearing — for 
hours ;  and  that  I  had  nearly  a  third  of  the  whole  Union  Army 
under  my  command  at  that  time,  &c." 

"  That  my  troops  did  not  fire  a  gun  during  the  entire  battle." 

"  That  I  did  not  attempt  to  assist  troops  elsewhere,  though  I 
had  written  Generals  McDowell  and  King,  I  believed  our 
forces  were  being  overpowered  and  driven  from  the  field,  and 

"  That  I  believed  the  enemy's  force  in  front  of  me  was  very 
heavy,  and  that  therefore  an  attack  would  be  unsuccessful." 

Answer.  I  shall  show  that  no  general  battle  was  in  progress 
between  noon  and  5.30  P.  M.  that  day  (August  29th),  and  in 
addition  to  the  testimony  heretofore  adduced,  I  will  show  by 
General  Pope's  ofticial  report,  that  between  these  hours  no  more 
than  "  heavy  skirmishing"  was  had  ; 

That  so  far  from  being  within  sight  or  sound  of  any  heavy 
firing  between  these  hours,  the  woods  were  so  dense  and  the 
ground  was  of  such  a  nature,  that  no  sound  of  a  general  or  any 
engagement,  other  than  artillery  firing  at  long  range,  reached 
me  or  my  command  ; 

That  my  troops,  while  but  little  engaged  in  action  that  day, 
held  a  position  of  the  highest  importance  ;  for,  as  stated  herein 
after,  they  were  so  disposed  as  to  draw  from  before  General 
Pope,  and  to  keep  the  whole  of  Longstreet's  larger  forces  in 
front  of  me,  thereby  securing  all  the  good  effects  of  a  battle 
without  its  injuries. 

I  shall  substantiate  the  evidence  that  I  was  held  in  my  posi 
tion  by  McDowell's  orders,  which,  being  reiterated,  caused  the 
recall  of  a  division  of  my  corps  moving  to  attack,  and  that  it 
was  not  judicious,  nor  admissable  upon  information  in  my  pos 
session,  furnished  from  time  to  time  by  General  McDowell  and 
others,  to  at  any  time  go  to  the  assistance  of  General  Pope  ;  the 
belief,  based  on  rumor,  expressed  in  my  note  to  Generals  Me- 


48 

Dowell   and  King,  having  been,   as   shown    in   the    evidence, 
incorrect. 

I  shall  substantiate  the  record  that  General  McDowell  was  in 
command  and  present  with  me  at  the  only  time  on  the  29th 
August,  before  6  P.  M.,  when  the  sounds  of  battle  (artillery 
only)  were  audible  ;  that  my  command  mainly  was  there,  and 
remained  during  the  whole  day  substantially  in  contact  with 
the  enemy ;  that  General  Pope's  order  to  General  McDowell 
and  myself  was  issued  on  the  erroneous  supposition  that  "  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  would  not  arrive  till  to-morrow  (the 
30th)  or  next  day  ; "  that  from  prisoners  then  in  my  possession, 
belonging  to  Longstreet's  corps,  and  from  General  Buford's 
letter  to  General  Ricketts,  shown  to  me  by  General  McDowell, 
in  connection  with  other  information  possessed  by  General  Mc 
Dowell,  it  was  evident  that  we  were  then  (twelve  o'clock  noon 
on  the  29th)  confronted  by  Longstreet's  forces,  and  that  the 
object  of  our  combined  movement  had  been  frustrated ;  that, 
acting  on  this  belief  and  on  General  Pope's  instruction  that 
"  the  troops  must  occupy  a  position  from  which  they  can  reach 
Bull  Run  that  night,"  General  McDowell,  exercising  a  discre 
tion  authorized  in  the  order,  directed  me  to  remain  on  that 
ground,  and  did  himself  turn  back  and  march  away  beyond 
support  of  me,  with  the  divisions  of  King  and  Ricketts  (over 
half  our  joint  forces),  to  a  point  close  to  Bull  Run,  which  he  was 
several  hours  in  reaching ;  and  that,  by  thus  withdrawing,  he 
prevented  all  possibility  of  severing  the  connection  of  Long- 
street  with  Jackson,  which  was  the  object  of  our  combined 
movement. 

T  will  also  prove  by  what  General  Pope  considers  competent 
authority — General  Longstreet  himself— that  I  was  correct  both 
as  to  the  greatly  superior  force  in  my  front,  and  as  to  the  pro 
bable  effect  of  an  attack  by  me. 

I  shall  prove  that  Longstreet  desired  an  attack,  and  consid 
ered  it  would  have  resulted,  after  McDowell's  withdrawal,  ad 
vantageously  to  himself,  and  as  suggested  that  evening  by  me 
to  General  Pope,  in  serious  disaster  to  my  corps ;  and  that  the 
position  taken  by  me,  not  only  saved  my  corps,  but  in  the  most 
effective  manner  served  the  purposes  of  General  Pope,  by  hold 
ing  in  check  a  force  largely  superior  to  may  own,  and  drawing 
supports  from  the  troops  opposing  General  Pope. 


49 


6th.  "  That  when  convinced  from  the  sounds  of  the  battle  on 
the  right,  that  our  army  was  being  worsted,  I  marched  away 
from  giving  assistance,  and  went  in  an  opposite  direction  al 
though  ;  the  road  was  open,  and  orderlies,  <fcc.,  passing  to  and 
fro." 

Answer.  As  I  have  said  above,  the  opinion  expressed  in  my 
note  to  Generals  McDowell  and  King,  proved  incorrect,  and 
was  not  acted  upon,  nor  was  it  designed  to  be  acted  upon,  as  is 
shown  in  the  note  itself,  till  "  I  communicated  with  them." 

I  have  shown,  and  will  bring  additional  testimony  to  show, 
that  at  no  time  did  I  march  away  from  giving  assistance,  or 
give  any  order  tending  to  do  so ;  but  all  day  and  all  night  of 
the  29th,  till  called  away  on  the  30th  by  General  Pope's  orders, 
the  largest  portion  of  my  command  remained  where  General 
McDowell  left  it,  and  directed  it  to  be,  which  was  in  almost  im 
mediate  contact  with  the  enemy,  while  the  remainder  was  pro 
perly  held,  during  the  same  time,  massed  in  rear  in  support, 
prepared  to  go,  if  called  or  necessary,  to  General  Pope's  assist 
ance,  taking,  as  it. was  then,  and  had  been  all  day,  on  the  only 
practicable  route,  the  same  road  taken  by  General  McDowell  and 
his  troops,  and  by  my  command  the  following  morning.  It  is 
true  that  General  McDowell,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion, 
did  march  away  with  his  command  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th 
August,  whilst  my  troops  did  not  march  away  till  the  next 
morning,  having  alone  confronted  and  held  the  enemy  till  that 
time,  and  most  fortunately,  as  I  shall  show  by  competent  testi 
mony,  for  our  other  forces. 

I  shall  also  show,  on  this  point,  that  the  orderlies  passing 
back  and  forth,  were  mainly  my  messengers  carrying  informa 
tion  to  and  in  vain  seeking  instructions  from  Generals  McDowell 
and  Pope,  and  that  so  far  from  bringing  information  that  as 
sistance  was  needed  by  General  Pope,  the  reverse  was  the  fact. 

1th.  "  That  the  effect  of  an  attack  by  me  at  any  time  between 
noon  and  eight  o'clock  of  the  evening  of  the  28th  of  August, 
even  though  repulsed,  would  have  been  most  beneficial,  and 
General  McDowell's  testimony  before  my  court  is  referred  to  as 
endorsing  this  view  of  the  case  "  arid  quoted  to  sustain  General 
Pope's  claim  that  "my  withholding  an  attack  between  the 
hours  of  twelve  and  eight  prevented  the  capture  or  destruction 
of  Jackson  on  the  29th  August." 
7 


50 

Answer.  General  Pope  apparently  forgets  that  General  ^Mc 
Dowell  expressed  this  as  a  "  mere  opinion,"  which  is  not  "  ev 
idence,"  and  that  it  was  based  upon  the  erroneous  opinion  that 
Jackson's  forces  alone  confronted  our  army  between  these  hours, 
and  to  the  exclusion  of  official  reports  from  his  general  officers, 
which  should  all  have  been,  as  some  were,  in  his  possession. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  state,  in  the  light  of  facts  now  read 
ily  ascertainable,  and,  at  the  time,  deemed  unnecessary,  adverse 
opinions  from  the  best  military  sources  can  and  will  be  given, 
completely  nullifying  this  opinion  of  General  McDowell,  if  still 
retained  by  him,  showing  at  that  time  no  such  opinion  was  en 
tertained  by  those  who,  having  been  in  contact  with  the  enemy, 
enjoyed  far  better  opportunities  of  possessing  correct  informa 
tion  than  either  General  McDowell  or  General  Pope.     It  is  true 
that  General  Pope  telegraphed  the  War  Department,  and  elec 
trified  the  country  by  the  information  that  "  the  enemy  was  re 
treating  to  the  mountains ;"  but  that  assertion  unhappily  proved 
untrue,  and,  as  is  known,  was  based  upon  a  total  misconception 
of  the  enemy's  forces  and  position. 

Sth.  That    even   though   the  question  of  a  largely  supeno 
force    confronting   me,  were   admissable,  it   is    (General  Pope 
claims)  shown  by  the  commanding-General  of  the  enemy  (J.  * 
B.  Stuart,  in  his  official  report)  to  have  been  very  small- 
he  disposed  of  his  small  force— trailed  brushes  to  cause  dust 
and  thus  convey  the  idea  of  numbers,  and  that  my  corps  halt, 
and  fell  back." 

Answer.  I  am,  perhaps,  saved  the  necessity  of  imputing  1 
General  Pope  a  want  of  veracity  in  this  respect,  inasmuch  as  he 
claims  to  quote  General  Stuart's  report  from  memory. 

Between  his  memory  of  the  report,  and  the  report  itself,  the 
difference  will  be  best  shown  by  reference  to  it,  by  which  it  will 

be  seen,  . 

That  Longstreet's  forces  were  on  the  field  before  my  an 
That    "  the  prolongation  of  my  line    of  march    would  have 
passed   through   Stuart's  position,"  «  a  very  fine  one  for  art i 
lery,"  and  "  struck  Longstreet  in  flank." 

That  he  awaited  my  approach  long  enough  to  ascertain  some 
thing  of  my  strength,  dragging  brush,  etc.,  to  attempt  to  deceive 
me  notifying  the  commanding-General,  "then  opposite  me  on 
the  turnpike,"  that  "  Lonastreefs  flank  and  rear  were  seriously 


51 

threatened,  and  of  the  importance  of  the  ridge  I  held ;"  that 
immediately  the  brigades  of  Jenkins,  Kemper,  and  D.  K.  Jones 
Avere  sent,  together  with  artillery,  placed  in  position,  and  waited 
my  advance,  and, 

That  after  exchanging  a  few  shots  with  rifled  pieces,  this 
corps  (mine)  withdrew  towards  Manassas,  "leaving  artillery 
and  supports  to  hold  the  position  till  night." 

In  explanation  of  this  last  paragraph,  I  shall  show  by  the 
recorded  testimony  and  confirmatory  evidence,  that  it  refers  to 
the  division  of  Morell,  sent  forward  by  me  after  General  Mc 
Dowell  retired  from  that  ground,  and  recalled  to  its  former 
position  under  General  McDowell's  reiterated  order,  before  any 
exchange  of  artillery  shots.  This  division  was  then  posted  on 
its  original  ground  (as  Morell  has  testified)  in  a  manner  to 
invite  attack,  and  was  there  held  till  daybreak  the  following 
morning. 

In  addition  to  the  force  at  that  time  sent  to  General  Stuart,  a 
division  was,  later  in  the  day,  withdrawn  from  the  support  of 
Jackson  and  placed  in  my  front,  on  the  extreme  right  of  Long- 
street's  forces,  "in  case,"  says  General  Longstreet's  official 
report,  "  of  an  attack  against  my  right." 

Thus  it  is  proven  by  the  enemy  themselves  that  my  action 
and  the  position  retained  by  my  corps  drew  from  General 
Jackson's  support  a  large  force. 

9tk.  "  That  Lonstreet  himself  reports  that  his  corps  had  made 
large  and  forced  marches,  and  also,  on  the  day  in  question 
(August  29th),  had  made  a  forced  march  and  fought  Ricketts' 
division,  and  that  my  troops  were  fresh,  and  nearly  or  quite 
equal  in  numbers  to  Longstreet ;  "  and 

"  That,  if  Longstreet's  corps  had  so  great  a  numerical  superi 
ority,  it  is  remarkable  he  did  not  attack  me." 

Answer.  A  reference  to  General  Longstreet's  Report  (volume 
9,  Rebellion  Record,  p.  570)  shows  the  inaccuracy  of  this  state 
ment  of  General  Pope.  Not  one  word  is  written  by  General 
Longstreet  as  to  his  troops  having  made  long  and  forced 
marches  ;  and  all  references  by  Longstreet,  Hood,  and  D.  R. 
Jones  (a  small  part  only  of  the  latter's  division  having  engaged 
Risketts)  to  the  encounter  with  Ricketts'  division,  show  that  it 
was  only  "a  spirited  little  engagement"  (loss  of  twenty-five 
men),  "heavy  demonstrations  and  skirmishing"  on  Ricketts' 


52 

side  ;  and  this  all  occurred  <m  the  28th  of  August,  some  twenty 
hours  prior  to  the  events  referred  to. 

Gem-nil  Longstreet's  failure  to  attack  my  inferior  forces  has 
no  pertinency,  save  to  indicate  that  my  troops  were  so  disposed 
as  to  deceive  him  as  to  my  real  strength  and  purpose,  arid  thus 
relieve  General  Pope  from  combatting  an  enemy  already  too 
great  either  in  number  or  skill  for  him  to  successfully  attack. 

It  will  be  proved,  however,  that  the  desire  of  General  Long- 
street  was  to  invite  attack,  and  that,  had  I  fallen  into  this  error, 
his  position  and  strength  were  such,  whatever  the  condition  of 
his  troops,  that  my  command  would  probably  have  been  de 
stroyed. 

10#A.  "  That  I  did  not  even  try  to  pass  over  the  ground  be 
tween  me  and  the  enemy  on  the  29th  August,  which  I  claimed 
as  impassable,  and  also  occupied  by  the  right  wing  of  the 
enemy." 

Answer.  I  shall  show  that  the  movement  to  pass  over  that 
ground  was  thwarted  by  General  McDowell's  orders  to  me,  and 
most  fortunately  it  was  so  ;  and,  also, 

That  even  an  effort  to  communicate  by  messengers  failed, 
from  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  occupation  of  it  by  the 
enemy. 

Finally,  General  Pope  assumes  to  explain  the  cause  of  what 
he  terms  my  conduct  in  the  matter,  contained  in  the  charges 
brought  before  the  court. 

In  attempting  this  he  but  rehearses  what  was  termed  the 
"  animus"  of  my  alleged  conduct,  by  the  prosecution  on  the 
trial. 

A  few  words  in  explanation  of  these  dispatches,  which  seem 
to  have  highly  incensed  General  Pope,  may  suffice  for  the 
present.  They  were  confidential  (though  partly  official)  com 
munications  to  General  Burnside,  whose  tenure  near  Aquia 
Creek  was  dependant  upon  correct  information  of  our  move 
ments  and  of  those  of  the  enemy.  Made  at  his  request,  they 
became  official  by  the  anxious  call  of  the  President  for  just 
such  information  as  I  was  giving  of  the  Army,  communication 
with  which  had  been  cut  off,  except  by  the  channel  I  had,  at 
great  trouble,  and  in  fear  of  disaster,  established  and  main 
tained  till  eventually  called,  August  29th,  by  General  Pope  to 
Centreville.  This  point  was  nearer  and  on  the  direct  road  tq 


53 

Alexandria,  through  which  General  Burnside  would  necessarily 
the  soonest  hear  of  us,  and  I  so  informed  him. 

They  were  not  designed,  as  asserted  by  General  Pope,  for 
General  McClellan,  of  whose  position  and  relations  to  the  army 
I  knew  nothing.  In  the  haste  of  dispatch  they  were  carelessly 
expressed.  If  they  manifested  confidence  in  General  Mc 
Clellan,  and  a  distrust  of  General  Pope's  ability  to  conduct  the 
campaign  (as  claimed  by  the  prosecution),  they  but  expressed 
the  opinion  pervading  our  Eastern  armies. 

Each  dispatch  covered  one  of  General  Pope's  orders,  and  was 
designed  to  convey  a  correct  impression  of  affairs,  and  to  undo 
the  effect  of  false  reports.  Should  I  be  blamed  if  they  show- 
as  is  now  .  apparent — that  General  Pope  at  least  misconceived 
the  situation,  and  that  I  was  better  acquainted  than  he  is 
willing  to  admit  he  was,  with  the  position  and  movements 
of  the  contending  forces  and  the  wants  of  the  army,  and 
that  forseeing  the  inevitable  results  of  that  campaign,  I  should 
have  tried  to  provide  against  its  disaster  ?  Would  I  not  have 
been  justly  held  culpable  had  I,  knowing  the  truth,  foiled  to 
have  expressed  it,  even  without  the  call  of  the  President, 
through  General  Burnside— and  pointed  out,  as  I  did,  the  mode 
of  guarding  against  the  effects  of  misfortunes  already  brought 
upon  us  and  others  to  come  ?  Because  I  indicated  the  inevitable 
results  of  this  campaign,  General  Pope  unjustly  claims  I  de 
sired  and  worked  for  them. 

I  have,  however,  to  state  that  the  President,  in  person,  thanked 
me  for  my  despatches,  as  furnishing  the  only  reliable  informa 
tion  received  at  that  time  from  the  army,  and  as  leading  to  the 
happiest  results. 

I  believed,  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  as  I  do  now,  that,  if  at  the 
time  and  in  the  manner  I  desired,  all  my  despatches  had  been 
permitted  in  evidence  as  well  as  the  occasion  of  sending  them, 
connected  with  the  desire  of  the  President  to  have  just  such  in 
formation,  this  element — so  delicate  at  all  times  to  righteously 
use— probing  and  deciding  upon,  as  it  assumed  to  do,  the  secret 
thoughts  and  purposes  of  the  human  mind — that  this  element, 
my  "  animus,"  so  potentially  used  against  me,  would  have  been 
completely  foiled  of  its  purpose,  and  this,  too,  without  adducing 
n  my  behalf,  as  under  such  proceedings  I  should  have  had  the 


54 

right  to  do,  :in  untarnished  record  both  prior  and  subsequent  to 
the  unfortunate  campaign  of  General  Pope. 

General  Pope  comments  upon  the  duty  of  subordinate  offi 
cers  towards  a  General  commanding;  asks  what  confidence 
such  an  officer  could  have  if  his  subordinates  were  at  liberty  to 
judge  of  his  purposes  or  plans,*and  does  not  see  how  any  com 
binations  of  his  could  be  expected  to  result  successfully  except 
through  implicit  obedience. 

These,  and  kindred  expressions  are  interpolated  in  General 
Pope's  communication.  I  shall  not  assume  that  propositions  of 
the  nature  of  truisms  of  no  pertinency  to  the  occasion,  evi 
dently  pressed  into  service  for  a  palpable  purpose,  need  refer 
ence  at  your  hands,  or  that  of  military  men. 

I  do  propose,  if  permitted  to  do  so,  to  demonstrate  by  compe 
tent  military  authority,  that  in  their  opinion,  but  for  the  action 
and  disposition  of  my  corps  during  this  eventful  day  of  General 
Pope's  campaign,  not  only  would  my  own  corps  have  been  need 
lessly  sacrificed,  but  his  entire  army  put  in  such  a  plight  as  to 
be  of  no  avail  in  the  defence  of  the  Capitol  itself,  which  must 
then  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  left  unguarded. 

Although  such  demonstration  is  not  necessary  to  my  vindica 
tion  as  against  General  Pope's  charges,  it  may  awaken  sugges 
tions,  the  advantage  of  which  I  may  at  least  partially  claim. 

In  general  terms  throughout  his  letter,  General  Pope  ignores 
the  testimony  given  in  my  behalf  of  such  officers  as  Generals 
Sykes,  Heintzleman,  Butterfield,  J.  F.  Reynolds,  Morell,  Griffin, 
Kuggles,  Locke,  Weld,  and  others,  whose  -career  before  and 
since  my  trial  would  warrant — I  presume  it  is  not  too  much  to 

say as  much  of  credence  as  either  the  testimony  or  the  opinion 

of  General  Pope  is  entitled  to. 

The  witnesses  on  either  side,  having  been  more  or  less  in  the 
public  service,  have  each  a  record  that  time  or  circumstances 
have  established.  I  propose  to  add  to  the  the  list  of  those  here 
tofore  adduced  by  me,  others  of  like  prominence,  equal  integrity, 
bravery,  and  unimpeachability. 

Should  the  commission  I  ask  for  be  granted,  General  Pope 
will  have  an  opportunity  to  add  whatever  of  testimony  he 
desires,  both  as  to  kind  and  amount. 

I  am  aware  of  the  tax  a  communication  so  lengthened — ne 
cessarily  so — imposes  upon  you. 


55 

May  I  urge  upon  you  to  give  me  the  opportunity  I  ask  of 
vindication  at  the  hands  of  the  Government  to  which  I  have 
given  my  best  years  and  of  doing  so  promptly  while  actors  and 
witnesses  are  yet  in  life. 

I  am  sir, 

With  high  respect, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER, 


[No.  IX.] 


The  following  documents,  in  addition  to  some  of  the  pre 
ceding  are  in  possession  of  the  Department. 

NEW  YORK,  January  14,  1807. 

To  His  Excellency,  ANDREW  JOHNSOX,  President  of  the  United 
States. 

SIR  : — I  beg  leave  to  respectfully  represent,  that  by  Court  Mar 
tial  convened  in  Washington  City  in  1862,  I  was  sentenced  "to 
be  cashiered,  and  forever  rendered  incapable  of  holding  office 
under  the  Government  of  the  United  States,"  and  that,  in  ad 
dition  to  all  the  penalties  attached  to  so  severe  a  sentence,  per 
sistent  efforts  have  been  made  to  fix  those  arising  from  the  un 
charged  crime  of  treason. 

Seventeen  years  of  my  life  have  been  spent  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States — years  covering  the  active  events  of  the  Mex 
ican  war,  and  including  the  opening  and  most  trying  years  of  the 
Rebellion.  Intrusted  at  all  times  with  duties  of  the  greatest  re 
sponsibilities,  frequently  performed  at  the  peril  of  life,  I  can  assert, 
without  fear  of  denial,  that  up  to  the  period  of  the  presenta 
tion  of  the  charges,  no  breath  of  suspicion  had  attached  itself 
to  a  reputation  which  it  had  been,  and  still  is,  my  life's  study  to 
preserve  unsullied.  I  feel  assured  your  Excellency  will  appre 
ciate  the  motive  that  induces  me  to  frankly  say  that,  at  no  time 
from  the  presentation  of  the  charges  to  the  completion  of  the 
trial,  did  it  occur  to  me  that  such  a  record  as  my  country  had 
generously  permitted  me  to  make,  could  I  by  any  court  be 
judged  guilty  of  willfully  neglecting  the  interests  of  that  coun 
try  in  its  hour  of  peril,  and  to  whose  reputation,  history,  and  wel 
fare  I  was  bound  by  every  sentiment  of  patriotism,  gratitude, 
and  interest. 

Conscious  of  innocence,  feeling  that,  whatever  differences  of 
opinion  might  arise  upon  other  points,  there  would  not  and 
could  not  be  any  as  to  my  faithfulness  of  purpose,  I  could  not 


57 


bring  my  mind  to  contemplate  any  other  verdict  than  that  of  a 
speedy  and  honorable  acquital. 

It  is  possible  I  may  have  committed  an  error,  both  as  to  the 
Court  and  myself  in  thus  assuming  much  that  should  have 
been  set  forth.  I  also  feel  assured  that  your  Excellency  will  ap 
preciate  the  motive  that  induces  me  to  make  reference  to  the 
events  of  my  life  while  in  my  country's  service.  The  vindica 
tion  of  my  honor  alone  compels  me  to  do  so  in  this  paper,  as  in 
a  previous  one  read  to  the  Court. 

The  verdict  against  me  was  found  January,  1863,  at  a  time 
of  most  unusual  excitement.  The  country  was  environed  with 
perils ;  distrust  had  seized  upon  many  minds  ;  errors  of  great 
magnitude  had  occurred ;  the  press  and  forum  vied  with  each 
other  in  responding  to  a  great  and  growing  sentiment  that  an 
example  should  be  had  by  which  faithlessness  or  incompetency 
should  be  promptly  dealt  with.  May  I  not  now  say  with  truth 
that  it  was  my  misfortune  to  be  charged  and  tried  at  this — to 
me — most  inopportune  of  periods  ? 

I  believe  it  is  safe  to  say  that  much  of  the  evidence  adduced 
against  me  upon  the  trial  would,  in  the  light  of  the  present  full 
information  upon  the  vital,  and  at  the  time  necessarily  disputed 
points,  be  either  entirely  changed  or  materially  modified.  Evi 
dence  of  the  most  important  character  to  me,  at  that  time  totally 
inaccessible  to  either  the  Court  or  myself,  is  now  to  be  readily 
obtained,  and  in  a  form  and  under  circumstances  brought  togeth 
er  that  admit  of  no  dispute.  Competent  and  disinterested  per 
sons,  including  many  of  those  who  deemed  my  trial  and  con 
demnation  just,  now  concur  in  the  completeness  of  the  vindi 
cation  which  this  "unconscious  testimony"  has  given  me. 

Relying  on  the  justice  of  my  government,  feeling  assured 
that  with  the  return  of  peace  calm  feelings  would  prevail,  and 
knowing  that  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  and  the  sur 
roundings,  time  would,  however  slowly  to  my  impatient  honor, 
prove  the  best  arbiter,  I  have  borne  in  silence  and  without  com 
plaint  the  burden  of  that  sentence. 

I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  enclosing  herewith  certain  docu 
ments  from  able  and  intelligent  writers,  which  bear  upon  my 
case.* 

*  SWINTON'S  Army  of  the  Potomac,  GREKLEY'S  American  Conflict,  an  article  bv  Mr.  A. 
H.  GUERNSEY,  Editor  Pictorial  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

8 


58 

It  is  useless  to  say  more  than  that  they  bear  unsolicited  con 
firmation  so  far  as  they  go ;  and  I  believe  the  time  is  at  hand 
when  it  is  my  duty  to  appeal  to  my  government  for  a  revision 
of  my  case,  however  nearly  such  a  revision  comes  home  to  me 
and  all  I  hold  most  sacred  in  my  life. 

It  is  a  duty  that  I  owe  also  to  the  honored  officers  who  bore 
testimony  in  my  behalf,  to  my  brave  command,  whose  history 
has  been  imperishably  written,  and  to  my  country,  that  no  stain 
of  injustice  shall  be  recorded  against  her. 

My  appeal  is  to  your  Excellency  to  appoint  a  court  for  the 
purpose  of  reconsidering  the  proceedings  in  my  case,  composed, 
as  I  trust  it  may  be,  of  the  best  talent  and  most  approved  patri 
otism  in  the  army. 

I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that,  with  such  a  court 
instituted,  and  with  the  full  testimony  now  to  be  obtained,  I 
can  obtain  the  full  and  honorable  acquittal  I  know  I  deserve; 
and  which  I  shall  ever  seek  at  the  hands  of  my  country. 

With  high  respect,  I  am  your  obedient  servant, 

FITZ  JOHN  PORTER. 

The  subjoined  letters  are  filed  with  this  appeal : 

NATICK,  Nov.  26,  1866. 
To  President  Johnson : 

SIB,— I  have  been  informed  that  new  evidence  has  been  dis 
covered  touching  the  case  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  late  a  Major- 
General  in  the  volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States, 
fully  join  with  others  in  recommending  the  appointment  of 
commission,  to  consist  of  officers  of  acknowledged  capacity  and 
character,  to  examine  the  evidence  and  ascertain  whether  injus 
tice  has  been  clone  this  officer  or  not,  who,  up  to  the  time  of 
the  alleged  offence,  maintained  the  character  of  an  c 
courage  and  ability. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  HENRY  WILSON. 


59 

I  think,  with  General  Wilson,  that  a  careful  review,  by  a 
competent  military  commission,  of  the  proceedings  of  the  case 
of  General  Porter  is  an  act  of  justice,  and  which,  in  trials  before 
civil  courts,  is  always  granted  as  a  matter  of  right.  I  trust  his 
request  will  be  granted. 

(Signed)  JOHN  SHERMAN. 

I  cheerfully  unite  with  General  Wilson  in  the  within  recom 
mendation. 

(Signed)  IRA  HARRIS. 

Senate  Chamber,  Jan.  16,  1867. 

I  concur. 

(Signed)  HORACE  GREELEY. 

I  cheerfully  concur  in  the  opinions  above  expressed. 

(Signed)  L.  F.  S.  FOSTER. 

Jan.  17,  1867. 

I  concur,  most  cordially,  in  the  recommendations  of  Senators 
Wilson,  Sherman,  Harris,  and  Foster,  and  express  unreservedly 
my  belief  that  a  re-examination  of  this  case  is  due  to  General 
Porter  and  the  Government. 

(Signed)  N.  P.  BANKS. 

House  of  Representatives,  Jan.  17,  1867. 

Major-General  Fitz  John  Porter  was  the  first  military  officer 
sent  by  the  Government  to  Harrisburg,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
rebellion,  and  of  the  many  who  succeeded  him,  none  of  them 
were  more  zealous,  faithful,  and  useful.  I  gave  him  my  full 
confidence,  and,  from  the  high  opinion  I  then  formed  of  him, 
was  surprised  when  his  loyalty  was  doubted.  Believing  that 
subsequent  events  and  evidence,  not  produced  at  his  trial,  fully 
justify  a  new  trial,  I  very  cordially  and  earnestly  unite  with 
Senator  Wilson  and  other  distinguished  gentlemen*  who  concur 
with  him  in  the  within  paper,  in  asking  for  General  Porter  the 
appointment  of  a  new  commission  to  hear  his  case,  that  justice 
may  be  done. 

A.  G.  CURTIN. 

Jan.  17,  1867. 


60 


To  the  President  of  the   United  States. 

"  Your  memorialists  respectfully  represent  that  by  a  court- 
martial  convened  at  Washington,  Major-General  Fitz  John 
Porter  was  sentenced  to  be  cashiered,  '  and  rendered  forever 
incapable  of  service  under  the  government  of  the  United 
States.' 

That  such  a  sentence  is  to  a  gallant  officer,  in  some  respects 
worse  than  a  sentence  of  death,  inasmuch  as  it  makes  him  the 
living  and  conspicuous  victim  of  a  terrible  penalty. 

That  a  few  weeks  before  the  terrible  events  which  drew  upon 
General  Porter  this  severe  sentence,  he  received  the  highest  re 
ward  which  the  President  can  bestow,  for  skill  and  gallantry 
in  one  of  the  most  important  actions  of  the  war. 

Your  memorialists  are  advised,  that  following  the  impulses 
of  a  controlling  love  of  justice,  your  Excellency  has,  on  many 
occasions  during  the  war,  reconsidered  and  revoked  the  sen 
tences  of  court-martials  in  cases  far  less  grave  than  the  present, 
patiently  employing  your  time,  notwithstanding  the  urgent  de 
mands  upon  it,  in  sifting  and  weighing  the  evidence  and  listening 
to  the  explanations  and  defence  of  the  accused. 

And  your  memorialists  in  consideration  of  the  extreme  se 
verity  of  the  sentence  in  the  case  of  Major-General  Fitz  John 
Porter,  and  of  his  previous  high  reputation,  honorably  earned 
on  fields  of  peril  and  death,  respectfully  solicit  you  to  recon 
sider  the  proceedings  of  the  court-martial  by  which  he  was  con 
demned. 

This  course,  they  beg  leave  to  suggest,  must,  in  whatever 
event,  be  satisfactory  to  your  Excellency.  Should  the  result  be 
adverse  to  General  Porter,  it  will  strengthen  you  in  the  convic 
tion  that  the  original  sentence  was  just.  If  favorable  to  the 
General,  it  will,  your  memorialists  are  confident,  afford  your 
generous  nature  the  highest  gratification  which  it  is  capable  of 
enjoying. 

EDWARD  EVERETT, 
ROBERT  C.  WINTHROP, 
AMOS  A.  LAWRENCE, 
GARDNER  ROWLAND  SHAAV." 

BOSTON,  August,  1863. 


61 


BOSTON,  September  21,  1867. 

GENERAL: — At  a  meeting  of  the  officers  of  the  first  division, 
5th  corps,  called  together  to  give  an  expression  of  sympathy  at 
the  death  of  our  loved  commander,  General  Griffin,  the  enclosed 
petition  was  presented  and  signed  by  all  the  officers  present. 

The  duty  of  forwarding  the  document  to  you  was  entrusted 
to  me,  and  in  so  doing  I  would  say  that  I  express  the  sentiments 
of  most  of  those  who  served  under  General  Porter  in  saying 
thot  they  most  earnestly  desire  that  his  request  for  a  new  trial 
be  granted. 

It  was  my  fortune  to  be  in  command  of  a  regiment  in  Gener 
al  Porter's  corps,  during  that  unfortuuate  campaign  which  ended 
in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  having  personal  knowledge  of 
many  of  the  circumstances  connected  with  his  career,  I  have 
always  felt  that  he  was  most  unjustly  dealt  with. 

Very  respectfully  yours, 

L.  STEPHENSOX,  JR., 
Late  of  32nd  Massachusetts  Volunteers. 

BOSTON,  September  17,  1867. 

The  undersigned,  who  have  served  as  officers  of  the  fifth  corps 
under  General  Fitz  John  Porter,  respectfully,  but  urgently, 
request  that  the  proceedings  in  his  case  may  be  revised,  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  application  which,  they  learn  from  the  public 
press,  he  has  addressed  to  the  department. 

Wm.  S.  Tilton,  lately  brevet  brigadier  general,  United  States 

volunteers. 

A.  P.  Martin,  late  brevet  colonel  United  States  volunteers. 
George  M.  Barnard,  Jr.,  late  brevet  colonel  eighteenth  Massa 
chusetts  volunteers. 

John  W.  Mahan,  late  major,  ninth  Massachusetts  volunteers. 
Aaron  F.  Walcott,  late  first  lieutenant  battery  C,  Massachu 
setts  volunteers. 

Francis  J.  Parker,   colonel   thirty-second   Massachusetts  in 
fantry. 

Geo.  A.  Batchelder,  brevet  lieutenant  colonel  twenty-second 
Massachusetts  volunteers. 


62 

Mich.  Scanlan,  captain  ninth  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

P.  T.  Hanley,  late  lieutenant  colonel  ninth  Massachusetts  vol 
unteers. 

John  M.  Tobin,  captain  ninth  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

James  F.  Moore,  lieutenant  second  Maine  volunteers. 

Walter   S.  Davis,  brevet   lieutenant   colonel   twenty-second 
Massachusetts  volunteers. 

Louis  N.  Tucker,  brevet  major  eighteenth  Massachusetts  vol 
unteers. 

Marcus  M.  Davis,  captain  twenty-second  Massachusetts  vol 
unteers. 

Thos.    Sherwin,  Jr.,  brevet  brigadier  general,  late   twenty- 
second  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

L.  Stephenson,  Jr.,  brevet  brigadier  general,  late  thirty-second 
Massachusetts  volunteers. 

J.  Gushing  Edwards,  brevet   brigadier   general,  late  thirty- 
second  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

Chas.   K.   Cobb,  first  lieutenant  and  adjutant,  late   thirty- 
second  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

Edward  O.  Shepard,  brevet   lieutenant   colonel,  late  thirty- 
second  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

Chris.  Plunkett,  late  captain  ninth  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

Wm.  M.  Strachan,  lieutenant  and  adjutant  ninth  Massachu 
setts  volunteers. 

Wm.  M.  Strachan,  late  captain  ninth  Massachusetts  volun 
teers. 

Chas.  W.  Thompson,  first  lieutenant  thirty-ninth  Massachusetts 
volunteers,  formerly  twelfth  Massachusetts  volunteers. 

John  F.  Doherty,  late  captain  ninth  Massachusetts  infantry. 

P.  E.  Murphy,  late  first  lieutenant  ninth  Massachusetts  vol 
unteers. 

Wm.  H.  Gerty,  late  captain  thirty-second  Massachusetts  vol 
unteers. 

B.  F.  Finan,  late  first  lieutenant  ninth  Massachusetts  infantry. 

C.  C.  Bumpus,  captain  thirty-second  Massachusetts  volunteers, 

company  B.  • 

General  IT.  S.  GRANT. 


63 

HARTFORD,  CONNECTICUT,  September  21,  1867. 

MY  DEAR  GRANT, — Fit/  John  Porter  writes  to  me  to  ask  that 
I  will  do  something  to  aid  him  in  getting  a  rehearing  of  his  case. 
All  that  I  can  do  is  to  write  you,  and  give  you  the  reasons  why 
I  think  it  will  be  an  act  of  justice  to  give  him  the  opportunity  to 
clear  himself  from  the  terrible  imputation  now  resting  upon  him. 

I  saw  Porter  in  Pope's  company  the  day  after  the  latter's 
defeat  at  Bull  Run,  and  afterwards,  until  we  arrived  in  front  of 
AVashington.  I  know  that  they  were  on  very  cordial  terms, 
and  that  Pope  on  some  occasions  advised  with  him  confiden 
tially.  I  talked  a  good  deal  myself  with  Pope,  and  I  think  that 
if  he  had  had  at  that  time  any  feeling  that  Porter  had  acted 
badly,  I  would  have  learned  it  then  ;  but  I  had  no  suspicion  that 
he  felt  aggrieved  at  anything  Porter  or  any  one  who  was  then 
near  him  had  done.  At  Fairfax  Court  House,  the  day  that  we 
arrived  at  Washington,  I  noticed  that  Pope  was  particularly  in 
good  spirits  and  cordial  with  Porter.  I  have  therefore  always 
thought  that  the  attack  upon  Porter  was  the  result  of  an  after 
thought,  and  that  the  charges  were  not  original  with  Pope. 

During  the  trial,  I  thought  it  proper  to  inform  Porter  that 
Generals  J.  F.  Reynolds,  George  H.  Thomas,  and  myself  would, 
if  requested,  go  before  the  court  and  swear  that  we  would  not 
believe  Pope  or  Roberts  under  oath.  I  had  consulted  General 
Reynolds  before  I  made  the  proposition.  He  consented  to  go 
himself,  and  thought  General  Thomas  would  have  no  hesitation 
in  giving  such  evidence.  I  was  myself  well  convinced  of  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  opinion  of  Pope's  veracity,  from  what  I  had  often 
heard  him  say  before  the  war.  Porter  declined  to  call  us  up  to 
give  this  evidence,  on  the  ground  that  the  court  appeared  so 
well  disposed  towards  him,  and  his  case  was  going  on  so  well, 
that  he  did  not  wish  to  irritate  the  court  by  an  attempt  to  break 
down  the  evidence  of  the  principal  prosecutors.  The  sequel 
showed  that  he  made  a  serious  mistake. 

But  I  think  that  the  most  equitable  reason  for  a  review  of 
Porter's  case  is  this  :  The  Judge- Advocate-General,  Holt,  was 
the  judge-advocate  of  the  court.  That  was  right  enough.  But 
no  one  will  deny  that  a  judge-advocate  of  a  military  court,  when 
a  prisoner  is  defended  by  able  counsel,  becomes  to  a  great  extent 
a  prosecutor,  and  as  such  necessarily  is  biased  against  the  pri 
soner.  To  say  that  General  Holt  was  prejudiced  against  Porter 
is  merely  to  say  that  he  is  like  other  men,  and  that  he  was  so 


64 

prejudiced  the  whole  proceeding  shows.  Whether  it  is  better 
or  worse  for  the  course  of  justice  that  the  judge-advocate  should 
be  prejudiced  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  question. 

But  an  abstract  of  the  proceedings  and  finding  and  sentence 
of  the  court  had  to  be  made  by  the  J  udge-Advocate-General  for 
presentation  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  upon  which 
(for  he  necessarily  could  not  read  the  evidence)  he  was  to  make 
up  his  mind  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.  Was 
it  right,  proper,  or  decent  that  this  abstract  should  be  made  up 
by  the  very  man  who  had  done  his  best  to  convict  the  prisoner  ? 
Did  not  such  a  proceeding  prevent  the  President  from  learning 
any  extenuating  circumstance,  or  finding  out  anything  weak  in 
the  evidence,  if  any  such  there  were  ?  Did  ' c,  not,  in  fact,  take 
away  any  chance  from  Porter  which  he  might  have  had,  had  a 
cool,  unbiased  person  of  legal  knowledge  made  this  abstract, 
instead  of  General  Holt. 

The  whole  business  seems  to  me  like  a  prosecuting  attorney 
passing  sentence  upon  a  prisoner  in  a  civil  court,  immediately 
alter  the  speeches  of  counsel.  I  think  the  fact  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  only  general  Holt's  abstract  to  guide  him,  in  making  up 
an  opinion  on  the  proceedings  of  that  court,  is  enough  to  in 
validate  the  whole  thing. 

It  has  been  said,  and  perhaps  with  truth,  that  there  is  no  pre 
cedent  to  guide  in  this  matter.  It  may  be  said  with  equal  truth 
that  never,  since  the  trial  of  Admiral  Byng,  was  injustice  so 
without  precedent  done.  I  think  that  there  never  was  a  more  ap 
propriate  opportunity  for  going  beyond  precedent,  and  establish 
ing  the  fact  that,  no  matter  how  or  by  whom  flagrant  injustice  is 
done,  you,  when  the  power  is  in  your  hands,  will  see  the  right  done. 

For  my  part,  I  know  that  Porter  was  as  loyal  as  the  most 
loyal  soldier  now  dead,  and  that  no  thought  of  treason  or  disaf 
fection  entered  his  brain.  He  was  a  victim  to  Pope'«  failure  in 
Virginia,  and  it  seems  to  me  he  has  remained  a  victim  long 
enough.  You  will,  in  my  opinion,  do  an  act  which  will  not  be 
the  least  among  those  which  will  make  up  your  fame,  if  you  will 
lend  your  weight  towards  giving  Porter  the  opportunity  to 
retrieve  his  character  as  a  citizen  and  soldier. 

I  am  truly  your  friend, 

W.  B.  FRANKLIN. 

General  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Commanding  Army  of  the  United  States. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 
LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
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LD 


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Gaylamount       > 
Pamphlet          J 

Binder 

Gaylord  Bros.,  Inc.    • 

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T.  M.  Reg.  U.S.  Pat.  Off.  . 


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